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This paper represents a study of the non-wage
component of compensation, and its effect on the labor
market, on public finance, and on the general economy of the
country. It is the intention of the writer to show how non-
wages have become an accepted method of compensating an
employee by explaining what non-wages are, why they are needed
and what they cost the employer. Through the utilization of
specific categories of non-wages it is anticipated that the
impact of this comparatively recent phenomenon in industry
can be dramatically illustrated.
This study will touch on the broad aspects of the
subject. No attempt has been made to analyze each and every
aspect of non-wages because they are too varied and categories
of non-wages too numerous. The conclusions will attempt to,
one, support the contention that actually little is known and
less is understood about the effects of fringe benefits, and
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Compensation is "the payment made to members of work
teams for their participation."* it could be described as
payment for services rendered. The payment may be immediate,
as in basic pay, or maybe deferred, as in retirement. It may
be an hourly-based wage or a yearly-based salary. It may be
service-wide, as basic pay is in the military, or special
and contingent, as hazardous duty pay is in the military.
The only common denominator is that it is a reward for services
» wpaow mmmm
rendered.
The application of the term to payment for services
rendered was originally a stilted piece of elaborate
politeness, a way of saying 'Of course we wouldn't
do anything so vulgar as to pay you; we offer this
sum merely to offset the loss of your time.' . . .
In America the term compensation has been used so
much for wages or salary that it is now standard
in that sense, with none of the connotations of
making amends for loss or damage.
2
Throughout the industries of the United States in 1961,
a salary or a wage constituted 79% of the employee's total
1
Dale Yoder, Personnel Management and Industrial
Relations (4th ed.j Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 475.
2 ...Bergen Evans and Cornelia Evans, A Dictionary of
Contemporary American Usage (New York: Random House, .1957),
p. 107.

compensation. Salary has a definition which is accepted
as universal; it may be defined as the amount paid to an
employee whose contract calls for a monthly or annual compen-
sation. In general, wages are the payments made to those
who h*ve no guarantee of employment throughout the week,
or from one week to the next.
Compensation is a small, but vital part of a larger
area of management, broadly described as industrial relations.
This is a designation given to the whole field of human re-
lationships which exist in modern industry. It is a function
that consists of planning, organizing, and controlling, as
well as procuring, developing, maintaining, and utilizing
people. The area Is broad and the functions cannot be easily
separated because they are interdependent.
Industrial relations or the "personnel function" is
only one aspect of management. The other phases, money and
material, are equally important. Yet these two latter aspects
depend upon the first. Koontz and O'Donnell have said that:
The coordination of human effort is the essence of
all grouped activities. • • • The fundamental
component of this association is management--the
function of getting things done through others. 5
3
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America,
Fringe Benefits 1961 , A Report Prepared by the Economic
Research Department (Washington, D. C: Chamber of Commerce
of the United States, 1962), p. 30.
u
Michael J, Jucius, Personnel ?1anagement (^th ed.;
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irivin, Inc., 1959), p. 6.
5Harold Koontz and Cyril O'Donnell, Principles of
Management: An Analysis of Managerial Functions (Mew York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955), p. 3.

3One tool available to assist in the achieving of this
coordination is compensation.
Concepts of Compensation
Compensation is complicated because management has
never determined a means by which it could measure how much
a man's work is worth in financial terms. This problem of
wages and salaries is compounded by the prominent part they
play in personal, economic, and social relationships. Wages
can be considered from the viewpoint of the employer or the
viewpoint of the employee. It has been thus since the earliest
days of recorded history. The owner of the vineyard felt he
knew what a man's work was worth:
But when evening had come the owner of the vineyard
said to his steward, 'call the laborers, and pay
them their wages, beginning from the last even to
the first.' Now when they of the eleventh hour
came they received each a dinarius. And when the
first in their turn came they thought that they
would receive more; but they also received each
his dinarius.
6
But the workers were not as certain:
And on receiving it, they began to murmur against
the householder, saying, 'These last have worked
a single hour, and thou hast put them on a level
with us, who have borne the burden of the day's
heat. 7
The employer-employee relationship with its many





uin modern industrial relations. The concomitant problems
of how to measure man's worth and how to satisfy his needs
were al30 evident. The vineyard employer answered one of the
workers:
Friend I do thee no injustice, didst thou not agree
with me for a dinarius? Take what is thine and go;
I choose to give to this last even as to thee.
Have I not a right to do what I choose? Or art
thou envious because I am so generous? 8
It could be assumed that this reply was satisfactory from the
employer's standpoint, but the worker's contentment was
probably less than ideal. Such a solution certainly would
not satisfy a modern day employee.
Since the end of the first World War, a new concept
of employment in industry has developed. Around employment
has grown a network of employer obligation and employee rights
which involve not only the dignity and welfare of the indi-
vidual worker but also the security and well being of the
members of his family. The consequence has been that in a
vast area of American industry, the pre-World War I "commodity
concept" of employment has been displaced by a post-World War
II "welfare concept" of employee-employer relations.^ One of
the most potent concepts of economics is that of the market.




Richard A. Lester, "Revolution in Industrial
Relations," Labor Law Journal, IX (June, 1958), p. «*39.

5converge to establish an exchange of a commodity at a price
or succession of prices. In the decades following the
Industrial Revolution this concept was applied to the purchase
and sale of labor services. Until World War I, labor was
viewed by corporate management almost in commodity terms.
Its purchase and sale were generally on a short-term basis.
Firms assumed few, if any, continuing obligations to employees;
the cash nexus was practically the only tie.
The Evolution of Employment Relationships
Employment relationships have passed through many
phases. Prior to the Industrial Revolution the most common
type of employee-employer relationship was that in which
employers were masters and employees were virtual slaves. A
typical employee of the period, one slightly above the true
slave, was the serf. The serfs' position in the manorial
system entitled them to certain fairly well-established rights.
Their duties and obligations were defined largely in terms of
the quantities of produce which they should render to the
master, and, if possible, military service. This era was
described as the "agricultural" period; the predominant
investment of production was the manor, and the principal
products were agricultural.
As time passed, some of the serfs developed special
skills, and those who did were occasionally able to purchase
10 Ibid. , **39.

6their freedom. Having once established their independence,
they were then able to sell their products or services.
These early entrepeneurs were designated artisans.
Essentially they were wage earners, but their wages were
subjected to regulation, principally by church authorities.
Eventually the artisans increased in numbers, and found that
it would be advantageous if they were to band together for
economic purposes. These groups became known as guilds.
Eventually layers appeared within the guilds; master-craftsmen,
journeymen, and apprentices.
The appearance of these layers within the guilds marked
the beginning of an early wage and salary apparatus. At the
same time, limited benefits and services began to make an
appearance; wages, hours, and other employment conditions were
determined by guild regulations. The guilds provided fraternal
as well as death, disability, and unemployment benefits.
The Industrial Revolution greatly affected the old
order within the guilds. Machines replaced hand tools, making
it necessary to have more capital and equipment to start a
business. Journeymen found it difficult to raise this money,
and without it, it became impossible for them to progress to
mastercraftsmen. The old guilds no longer were able to satisfy
the needs of their members. In time, the journeymen left the
older guilds and formed other groups known as yeomanry guilds.
This new type of guild was created for the purpose of protecting
Yoder, op. cit . t p. 37.

7the rights of the journeymen and apprentices in their dealings
12
with their employers, the master craftsman.
The factory system was an outgrowth of the Industrial
Revolution. Production moved from the home to the factory.
This move greatly altered the previous relationship between
the master and the journeyman. The master now became the
factory owner or industrial capitalist, 1 while the journeyman
and apprentice became the employees. Perhaps most important,
the employee now faced a future in which he would, in all
likelihood, remain an employee throughout his working lifetime.
Early working conditions within the factory reflected
the laissez-faire economic and political philosophy of the
period. No governmental regulations existed. The direction
of manpower was left in the hands of the factory owner. Banding
together by the employees for the purpose of bargaining for
better working conditions or wages was a criminal act. Women
and children were employed under conditions detrimental to
their health and welfare. The philosophy of the factory owner
was that social benefits would occur if no public interference
were attempted.
Changes occurred despite attempts by the owners to
keep conditions static. Real family income was higher as a
result of many members of a family all working. Living





conditions showed some slight improvements. Productivity
increased as did the capital-worker ratio. Families became
more adaptable and could be employed at various jobs. Finally
they progressed to the point where they were able to choose
from alternate employment opportunities.
Although the employee had progressed to the point
where he could choose his employer, he was still considered
as a commodity by the employer. This was revealed in the
philosophy of "scientific management" as well as in the
attitudes of American management. Management assumed that
man's goal in the factory was to make money. This kind of
assumption was representative of Frederick W. Taylor and his
followers in the "scientific management" movement. Actually
Taylor was preoccupied with improving production techniques
and was not concerned with the human needs of the employees.
Management's preoccupation with Taylor's "principle
of scientific management" caused them to consider man as a
machine and not as an individual. Management considered man
collectively as a "rabble". They felt that the nature of
human motivations was such that it could be satisfied by a
reward and punishment system and that this system would produce
the desired productivity. Following such a theory, management
deduced that an employee could be induced to produce more,
simply if he were paid more. Such a system of economic motiva-
tion led directly to the development of a method of compensation
known as the piece work incentive system.

9Management also assumed that each employee would
respond to an economic incentive as an isolated individual
and that group interaction among the employees would have no
bearing on productivity. It felt that man, like machines,
could be treated in a standardized fashion. The time-study
man could, through his calculations, obtain an average for
the "standard workman". The average could be applied to all
employees. Management also assumed man was normally passive
and must be stimulated in order to go into action. It readily
accepted Taylor's principles but they were objected to
strenuously by labor, particularly labor unions.
The Evolvement of the Welfare Concept
The evolution away from this commodity concept toward
a welfare concept of employment was caused by many factors.
The relative shortage of labor under full employment was one.
Another was the change in the composition of the nation's
14labor force. In the United States, at the turn of the
century, when great waves of immigration poured into this
country's growing industries, a worker had little protection
against arbitrary management action. Management lost this
advantage when immigration was curtailed. It was forced to
acknowledge the importance of the human factor in organizational
performance.
ll
*Lester, op. cit ., p. 439.
^Spaul Pigors and Charles A. Myers, Personnel Admini -
stration; A Point of View and a Method (4th ed.j New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), p. 6.

10
Another factor in the evolution was the advance in
the level of education of factory workers. Also, capital
investment per employee increased, resulting in increased
employee responsibility. This increase sparked a growth in
on-the-job training. All of these factors induced management
to think more in terras of the company* s investment in its
workforce and of the work-life attachment of the employee
to the firm. 16
Other developments shifted the emphasis from a worker's
gratification through money earnings to an on-the-job satis-
faction, and security for themselves and their families.
"Advances in psychology and sociology have indicated that
non-financial considerations are important in worker content-
ment and that . • . treatment of employees with respect and
17
winning their loyalty can pay off in company profits."
Labor union growth spurred management into placing
greater stress on personnel programs and human relations.
Instead of merely a means for employment, companies took on
many of the aspects of a community center, a school, a medical
and psychiatric clinic, and a polling and magazine office,
18
all in the name of good employee relations.""* However, there
are companies in business today that still adhere to the
"money is the only motivation" school of management, and are
Lester, loc. cit .





The labor unions played a significant role in the
eclipse of the commodity concept of employment. They have
done this by expanding the scope of bargaining and by adding
new dimensions to the employment concept. This expansion has
taken the form of new rights and protections. The obligations
incurred by the company extend from the moment the employee
commences his employment until he retires, in almost all cases,
and in an increasing number of instances are continued after
retirement until death. ^°
Formal labor-management relations and contractual
obligations make it even more difficult to eliminate individ-
uals from the work force. This means that people are going
to be around longer on a given job, and with a continuing
relationship, the nature of the relation and its fruitfulness
becomes more important. As the worker begins to feel secure
in his job and sure of his continued pay, other things—his
feeling about his superiors, about his fellow workers, about
himself, and about his job—become more important to him.'i
This shift to a welfare concept helps to account for
the long term decline in labor turnover rates in this country,
19Cf. "Lincoln Electric Bonus is No Gift," The Plain
Dealer (Cleveland), December 10, 1961, and "Incentive Program's
Success Scrutinized," The Christian Science Monitor , May 12,
1959.
20
Lester, op. cit ., pp. U39-U40.
21Mason Haire, Psychology in Management (Mew York:




especially in manufacturing industries. The benefits and
rights which accrue to the employee are not transferrable
from company to company, thus workers are less prone to change
jobs than they used to be. This is a significant evolution
in the nature of industrial employment; one which raises
interesting questions for the future.
The labor movement has blurred the distinction between
the blue-collar worker and the white-collar worker. The
plant workers' inferior status has been destroyed through the
use of collective bargaining, primarily, and to a lesser
extent by labor and social-security legislation. "Both
bargaining and legislation have represented decisions by
collective determination and community standards in contrast
22
to individual action and market standards." This can be
seen in the spread of management privileges to plant employees,
the enhancement of worker's status through legislative action,
the compression of the income structure through reduction
of differentials, and the participation of blue-collar workers
in the solution of management problems and decisions.
This change in the "labor-market" has had a pronounced
effect on compensation. In the first decade of the 20th
century the employee was compensated in money. The employer
looked upon these wages and salaries as the means of creating
and maintaining an effective working organization. Manage-
ment's interest was to adjust the wages and salaries to a
22Lester, op. cit ., p. H»»Q.
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level that would meet its needs at the lowest cost. Emphasis
on cost by the employer often causes him to think in terms of
paying for work rather than people. 23
A New Form of Compensation
Money has been the primary means of rewarding an
employee for services performed from the time of the Industrial
Revolution up to today. However, in 1963, it is not the only
method of compensation. Increasingly the rewards to employees
have taken the form of benefits and services. To illustrate
this change it is necessary to look at the relation of wages
to services and benefits, or non-wages as they were referred
to, just a few years ago.
In 1929, the emphasis was still on wages and salaries
rather than on services and benefits or non-wages, and in that
year non-wages represented but 1.3% of the costs of wages and
salaries. In 1961, these costs of non-wages had increased to
an average of 8.H% of wages and salaries for all industries. 21*
Without question non-wages have become a significant part of
the compensation costs of management. It is a recent develop-
ment in industrial relations and one that is not always well
understood by management. A detailed review of the subject
also indicates that labor does not always have a realization
of the effect of non-wages on the union movement within the
United States.
23,
Fringe Benefits 1961 t op. cit ., p. 32.




NON-WAGES—WHAT, WHY, AND HOW
As has already been indicated, compensation consists
of wages and non-wages. The first area, consists of salaries
as well as wages and is easily understood and comprehended by
the employer, the employee, the union, and the casual observer
of the labor-market. True, no one has solved the problem of
determining how much a man's work is worth to the satisfaction
of everyone concerned; still, there is little misunderstanding
of the wage structure. This is not true in the area of non-
wages, which are difficult to understand because they defy
easy definition. They have been loosely described as "fringe
benefits", a term which came into use during the second World
war. It described the money costs and employment benefits
which were on the periphery of, but actually outside, direct
wage payments. 1
Although "fringe benefits" is the commonly used term
to describe non-wages, a further investigation of the defini-
tions of the term illustrates the wide divergence among
authorities as to what they actually are. The definitions
are both broad and narrow, and all are difficult.
Austin M. Fisher and John F. Chapman, "Big Costs of
Little Fringes," Harvard Business Review , XXXII (September-




Some definitions include as fringes "income • • .
usually recognized as wages and regularly taxable, such as
overtime payments," and at the same time exclude " • . • pay-
ments that seem designed to benefit the employee and might
properly be taxable, such as board and lodging, health
services, and prerequisites of office." 2
Landman, for example, says "fringe benefits are goods
and services in addition to wage payments as conditions of
employment, as incentives for greater effort, as conveniences
for the employer, and/or as promoters of employee health, good
will, and efficiency," Such a definition raises some questions
as to whether a fringe, or for that matter wages themselves,
can be both a "condition of employment" and "an incentive for
greater effort." The terms tend to contradict each other.
An employee who receives fringes, and assumes them to be part
of the condition under which he came to work, may not be
inclined to view them as incentives and therefore should show
his appreciation for them through added effort. Too often he
will view these benefits as "nice but as an earned program,
and therefore not calling for an unusual amount of gratitude." 1*
^Hugh H. Macaulay, Jr., Fringe Benefits and their
Federal Tax Treatment (New York: Columbia University Press,
1959), p. 4.
3
J. Henry Landman, "The Taxability of Fringe Benefits,"
Taxes , XXXIII (1955), p. 173, cited by Hugh H. Macaulay, Jr.,
Fringe Benefits and their Federal Tax Treatment (New York
5
Columbia University Press, 1959), p. U.
^Chapman and Fisher, op. cit., p. 39.

16
The National Industrial Conference Board points out
that definitions verge between two extremes. "Any expenditure
in labor other than straight-time wages" is a broad definition
which could include items such as watercoolers, overtime pay,
and even wages of the personnel department. The narrowest
definition classifies as a fringe benefit "any company expendi-
ture above straight-time pay, that has cash value to the
individual employee." 6 The "cash value" aspect of this defini-
tion refers to the ability of the employee to convert the
benefit into cash and would eliminate employee meals, recreation,
most life insurance, and most pension plans.'
Perhaps as a result of the disagreement over definitions,
fringe benefits are more often listed than defined. There are
some extensive listings, such as the one compiled by Dale Yoder
which lists sixty-five different fringes.** Professor C. W.
Sergent in "Fringe Benefits: Do We Know Enough About Them?"
has itemized nearly sixty individual non-wages. 9
The National Industrial Conference Board agrees that
definition is difficult, but that fringes fall into four
categories.
5Harold Stieglitz, Computing the Cost of Fringe Benefits
,
Studies in Personnel Policy, Ho. 12 8, National Industrial
Conference Board, Inc. (New York, 1952), p. 5.
* bld
* Macaulay, op. cit ., p. 5.
Q
Yoder, op. cit ., p. 492. See Appendix I.
9
Macaulay, op. cit
., pp. 4 , 185-186. See Appendix II.
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1. Extra payment for time worked,
2. Payments for employee security.
3. Payments for time not worked,
H. Payments for employee services.
The Board then lists thirty-five candidates under the name
"fringe benefits."
Dale Yoder attempts to classify many of the non-wages
into either benefits or services. To him 'benefits' are
"regarded as the more tangible financial contributions to
employees—special payments to those who are ill, contributions
to employee savings, distribution of stock, insurance,
hospitalization, and private pensions. . . . 'services' . . .
are actions taken for the assistance or aid of employees, such
as the provisions of legal aid, or personnel counseling, or
recreational advice and guidance." Such a fine breakdown
may be unnecessary. Indeed, Yoder continues: "distinction
is not sharp or uniformily observed, as will be apparent from
the frequency with which the terms are used as synonyms. "**
Benefits and services have certain characteristics.
First, they are primarily advantageous to the employee. Second,
they are distinctly supplemental to regular wages. Third,
they are supported or financed in part, or altogether by the
employer. Fourth, they provide a type of assistance or aid that
Cf. Stieglitz, op. cit
. , pp. 3-9.
11




an employee, as an individual, either cannot or is not likely
to secure.^ The National Industrial Conference Board
characterized fringes much as Yoder has characterized benefits
and services . Yoder indicates that benefits and services are
14included "among so-called 'fringe* items," while the National
Industrial Conference Hoard uses the same characteristics listed
above to describe "Fringe Costs."15 The point to be made from
all this is that the line separating benefits, services, and
fringes is extremely fuzzy.
Increasingly the term "supplemental wages" or "supple-
ment to wages" is found describing fringe benefits. The United
States Department of Commerce lists certain fringes as "supple-
ments to wages and salaries," as in the National Income statis-
tics. The National Industrial Conference Board prefers to
refer to fringes as "plus-wage payments, benefits, and
services," because it is a general term which is more
descriptive. 1 ^
"Fringe benefits" seems to be the most popular phrase
and is the term used by the United States Chamber of Commerce
in its survey of compensation within industry in the United
States. 17
13 Ibid. ll+Yoder, op. cit ., p. 633.
1
5
Stieglitz, op. cit ., p. 6.
16 Ibid.
17 Fringe Benefits 1961 , op. cit .
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The Development of the Fringe Benefit
"Fringes" were seldom heard of in industry before the
lSHO's. They did exist prior to this time, but were of minor
consequence and "were confined largely to executives, super-
visors, and white collar workers."-1- 8 Executives, subject to
higher income taxes logically were the recipients and bene-
ficiaries of fringe benefits in the 3 0's. Paid vacations
probably accounted for the inclusion of the white collar
worker . * 9
It was with the advent of the social legislation of
the Franklin Roosevelt Administration, and the simultaneous
upsurge in the power of trade unions, that fringes really
2began to appear and multiply. Between 1929 and 19H0, the
total supplement to wages and salaries increased from $662
million to $2,311 million, a 3.5 fold increase. 21 This $662
million of untaxed wages represented 1.3% of the total wages
and salaries in 1929, whereas the $2,311 million represented
•4.6% of the total in 19»*0.
Managements in the mid-thirties were desirous of
maintaining industrial peace with the unions. As part of the
apparatus to obtain this peace, management often devised big-
sounding concessions, involving apparently nominal costs, and
18Fisher and Chapman, op. cit ., p. 37.
l 9Macaulay, op. cit ., p. 8.
20Fisher and Chapman, loc. cit .
21Fringe Benefits 1961 , op. cit ., p. 32.
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threw them into the pot. Jury pay, voting pay allowances, an
extra holiday, and similar fringes were unimpressive as
individual costs. Eventually when they began to accumulate
on most unionized payrolls these costs became impressive.™
In the 19*40' s, with social legislation already in
force, and wage controls in effect during the second World War,
the emphasis shifted to other labor income such as pensions,
health and accident insurance, group life insurance, and paid
vacations and holidays. Labor was scarce and management had
difficulty attracting good employees in the highly competitive
labor market. Wages were frozen, so management turned to
fringe benefits as a means both of holding and attracting
workers. The government was paying the bill for many of the
companies so that costs of these fringes were largely ignored
by management.
The fringes for the mass of hourly paid employees and
low salaried clerical force in industry blossomed with the
wage freeze. By 19*4 5, the total supplement to wages and
salaries had increased to $5,6 01 million. 23 The benefit pattern
had been set and neither labor or management would be able to
forget about fringes in the future.
By 19H9, fringes had become an important part of every
payroll. According to the Chamber of Commerce, fringe payments
represented 11.3% of payrolls in the selected companies it
22Fisher and Chapman, loc. cit .
23 Fringe Benefits 1961, loc. cit.
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surveyed. This represented a cost of $1H3 per employee per
year.^ 1*
Labor was demanding, or industry was offering increas-
ing benefits to workers even when business was slack. The
Korean War accelerated the trend and the acceleration continued
25ever since.*
By 195*+, management had become aware that these
special inducements or extras were now a fixed part of the
accepted employment structure and were regarded as the subject
of negotiation between labor and aianagement on the same basis
as issues of wages and salaries.
Several scattered facts on the size and growth of
fringe benefits have been given. The factors of a rising
social consciousness, the advent of wage controls, competition
among employers for workers, and increased tax rates all con-
tributed to this growth. The aroused social responsibility
resulted in legislation which improved the laboring man's
future. The rousing consciousness caused management to become
aware of certain responsibilities it had toward its employees.
It could be argued whether management actually felt empathy
toward its employees, or whether the rise in power of labor
unions pushed management into that position.
2H
Ibid ., p. 28.




Wage controls during both the second World War and
the Korean period brought "a burgeoning of benefits, the
end of the freeze did not witness the passing of the hardy
perennials • • • they have remained and have drawn substance
2 6from other sources. " Traditionally cash wages had been the
chief weapon used by employers in their battle for employees.
Now, fringe benefits have become equally important. Originally,
when competition was stiff, the company offering the fringe
benefits had a great attraction for new workers; now the
situation has turned around to the point where the firms not
offering fringes fails to attract workers. The power of these
fringes to attract and hold workers is 3till being contested.
However, the employee is being "locked into" his company more
and more as fringe benefits continue to grow as a percentage
of total wages.
"Perhaps the most important single cause of the growth
of fringe benefits has been their tax treatment." 27 Certain
fringes are tax-preferred and so are desired by employees,
especially employees in the higher tax brackets. This influence
of taxes has caused a second pressure to bear, namely, the
high corporate tax rates and excess profit taxes have lowered
resistance of business to additional fringe benefits. 28






Macaulay feels that lesser causes have also influenced
the growth of fringes. He cites, as the additional causes,
the removing of insurance and pension contributions from wage
control, and the broadening of the area of collective bargaining
to include such fringe benefits as pensions, group insurance,
stock bonuses, houses and meals furnished by the employers;
2 9
all results of court interpretations of the Taft-Hartley Act.
These factors, plus the continued competition for employees and
the aroused social responsibilities of the employers, continues
to exist, which portends the continued growth of fringe
benefits. It should be obvious that fringe benefits creates
a semantic blur. This blur is a contributing reason why the
average businessman has scant knowledge of their true present
costs, their rate of growth, or their directional trends.
The Cost of the Fringe
Computing the costs of these fringes is a monumental
task. It is difficult for two primary reasons. First, no
two employers can agree as to what should be included as a
benefit and what should be excluded. The employers have no
corner of this misunderstanding; the unions cannot agree among
themselves either. With such a disagreement, no rationale can
be established, no base is found from which bargaining can
start, or from which costs can be computed. The second reason




identified, how can a dollar cost be placed upon it? As an
example, an hourly-paid worker receives his wages based on a
certain scale, but no such scale exists that tells the employer
how much that employee was paid for his rest period or wash-up
time.
Three questions might be asked. Why does management
need to know the cost of fringes? What are the fringe costs
that companies compute? How does a company put a price tag
on these various fringe benefits?
First, management needs to know the "why 1* because
the growth of fringe benefits has increased the cost of doing
business. Thus data on costs is useful in cost analysis,
employee education, and union negotiations. 3 ^
Seeing the cost of certain practices gives rise to
speculation as to how the costs can be controlled and how they
can be reduced. Although the practices are covered by union
contract and cannot be changed, the company can often control
the factors which contribute to the cost of the practice.
Aside from controls, the fringe cost data are important
as a first step in an attempt to evaluate the companies'
programs. Too often in the past a company has provided
fringes to its employees and when asked why they can seldom
give a rational answer. "Management rarely thinks why the
fringe should be given but rather it reasons it must grant
them otherwise it will face, at the best, dissatisfaction




among the employees or, at the worst, a strike."
Some of the more conventional reasons put forth as
to why fringes are granted are: (1) It is the "right" thing
to do; (2) it is necessary to attract and retain employees;
(3) unions must keep on demanding "more;" (k) a government
board sets a pattern and generalized it; (5) a union forces
a concession and generalized it; (6) "we can afford it;"
(7) we can get a better deal for our employees; or (8) keeping
up with the Joneses. 32
The company should view the fringe benefit and services
as a package. Armed with the data determined from the cost
analysis, the company should determine "the proper mix of
fringe benefits" 33 just as they would determine the proper
mixture for products and profits. This mix should maximize
employee satisfaction and assure efficient production. The
company must then determine how much money will be available
to cover the cost of the fringes for a given future period.
Next the company would assign preference values to each
fringe, having considered (1) the legal requirements, (2) em-
ployee preferences, and (3) management preferences.
31
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Joseph H. Foegen, "Product Mix for Fringe Benefits,"
Harvard Business Review, XXXIX (July-August, 1961), p. 67.
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The last and most important step is to decide which
would be the optimum combination of the various benefits to
produce the most desirable results. It is possible that the
methods of operations research could be applied in the solution
process. This approach will certainly not produce mistake-
proof results, but at least it would be a step toward putting
fringe benefits in a logical frame of reference rather than
allowing them to grow at random or at the whim of the unions.
Knowing the cost is simply good business.
A second practical use of knowing the cost of fringes
is in employee education. Putting a dollar and cents sign on
these fringe items is part of showing the employees a few more
of the economic facts of life. Pay checks only tell part of
the story.
Companies use many approaches in getting across this
idea. One approach is to speak of fringe expenditures in
terras of additional earnings or payments. A company will
publish these figures so that the employees can see how much
more they actually receive per hour. Figure 1 illustrates the
method used by the Minnesota and Ontario Paper Company to tell
its employees of their pay envelope extras. Occasionally such
an approach backfires on the company. The employee, on learn-
ing how much he received in fringes per hour, may ask
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Your paycheck is jusff
part of the story. ••
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Sure good job menu fair wage*, but il
mean* a lot of other things too . . ."extras"
that go a long way toward* making each
job more satisfying.
You might conilder these extras as an
added paycheck. Separately, they don't
teem to cost much, but In 1948 alone, such
Items amounted to over 10c per hour for
each hourly paid employee.
Mando provide* these benefits, plus many
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be more than "just a place to work," and
a good job more than "just wage*."
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fringes. Some union people feel that "fringe benefits,
although they benefit the employee, are neither pay for
work performed nor a spendable payment." Often the union
feels that the fringes are "conditions of employment under
which employees work. "3 6
A second and more widely used approach is to consider
fringe expenditures in terms of additional labor costs.
This approach stresses the "This is what the company spends on
3 7you" idea. Every employee of the United States Rubber
Company is given an annual report on the scope and size of
the fringe benefit program. The method varies from year to
year. In 1960, a receipted invoice was used to represent
the report and was nailed to each employee's home. In 1961,
the report took the shape of a price tag, as illustrated in
figure 2. The reverse side of the tag contained an explana-
3 8tion of how the average price of $158 6.3 was reached.
The Royal MacBee Corporation used a contest as a means
of communicating to their employees the value of their long-
range benefits. Royal MacSee reproduced a company pay check
in the monthly employee publication. An entry blank was
printed below the check, certain blanks representing ten
3 5
ctieglitz, op. cit
. , p. 5.o
36 Ibid . 37 Ibid .
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separate fringe benefits. Each month the employee estimating
closest to the cost per employee of the particular "fringe
of the month" received a savings bond. Thus Royal MacBee
made a communications program interesting and informative. 39
Management must know the costs of fringes if it expects
to bargain successfully with unions. The time when unions were
primarily concerned with increase in wages and decreases in
the work week has passed. Unions view fringes "as a package
of money gains." 1* The unions tell their members that they
have received an x cents per hour package—so much across the
board and so much in fringes. Industry must be able to compute
the cost of the fringes to bargain intelligently. The question
as to "What are these costs?" brings management back to the
point which is so often discussed: "What is meant by a
fringe?"
Is It a Fringe ?
The practice included in fringe costs tabulations
vary from company to company. There is no standard definition
which meets all companies' concepts of fringes. Managements
do agree on four basic categories :***•
39
J. Roger O'Meara, "Hidden Pay Check Contest,"
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1. Premiums for time worked.
2. Payments for time not worked.
3. Payments for employee benefits.
U. Payments for employee services.
"Premiums for time worked" includes overtime pay,
the oldest fringe benefit enjoyed by the blue-collar worker.
Time-and-a-half, double time, and shift differentials are all
well known terms. During the past two decades there have
been some innovations within this category that are not as
well known as time-and-a-half. Automatic wage adjustments
have become quite common, especially the escalator provisions,
which change wage rates to match changes in the level of
consumer prices, and the improvement factor provisions, which
specify a percentage increase in all rates to compensate for
the rising productivity of industry.
There is no unanimity among companies surveyed by
the National Industrial Conference Board as to whether overtime
pay should be included as a fringe. Some employers felt that
an employee was receiving extra wages for no additional unit
production on his part and therefore overtime should be included.
In contrast, other employers felt that overtime, although
legally required, is scheduled at the companies* discretion.
If the company wants the added work it must meet the cost or
it will not be competitive in the labor market place. Thus,
overtime should not be included as a fringe. 1* 2
Stieglitz, op. cit.« p. 8,
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Two newer members of the group of premium pay are
"call-in" and "call-back". The "call-in" fringe guarantees
an employee minimum pay regardless of how short a time he
works. "Call-back" pay guarantees an employee, who is called
in by an employer for emergency work, a minimum number of
hours of pay.
"Pay for time not worked" is a category in which most
companies agree on what should be included. There is little
doubt in the minds of the employer that this is pay for which
no production whatsoever is received in return. The spectre
of this entire category being considered as "conditions of
employment" is easy for management to conjure up. Included
in this category would be pay for holidays, vacations, summer
military leave, sick leave pay, personal excused absence, jury
duty pay, paid rest periods, paid wash up time, paid lunch
periods, severence pay, and Christmas bonus.
Other benefits in this category are questioned by some
companies. Much time is spent on grievances, so certain com-
panies feel that pay for this time is properly included as a
fringe benefit, while other companies feel that there is
"normal time" spent in communications and hearing grievances
which take the place of "open door" policies, and therefore
such costs should be excluded from fringe cost determinations.
Educational subsidies are considered by some as having
a cash value to the employee and therefore should be considered
as a fringe benefit. Other companies feel that the amount
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spent is relatively small and is not negotiated with the
unions and therefore should be excluded. The extent and
liberality of the programs are the keys to the company's
decision for inclusion. It is difficult to measure whether
a particular course of action may be beneficial only to the
employee, only to the employer, or to both, and this makes
it difficult to adjudge the costs. 1* 3
Profit sharing plans are included by the National
Industrial Conference Board survey under the category of
"pay for time not worked." There was unanimity among the
nine companies surveyed that it is properly included as a
fringe benefit. There is little argument as to whether it
is or is not a fringe, but there may be a question in the
minds of some as to whether profit sharing is properly "pay
for time not worked." Employees may not view it as such.
Some may feel that profit sharing is a partial reward to them
for increased productivity. At least one employer felt that
his "employees are ... ray partners and receive twenty-five
percent of the profits." Thus at least Hershey 1 s management
feels that profit sharing is a right of the employees and
probably cannot be considered as a fringe benefit.
A decision on where profit sharing should be placed
in the four categories of fringe benefits is academic. The
U3Ibid . UU Ibid ., p. 8.
lf5The Story of Hershey the Chocolate Town , Hershey
e Corporation, 1960, p. 23.Chocolat
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sharing can take several forms. A bonus can be considered
as profit sharing, regardless of its method of distribution.
Many companies, such as Lincoln Electric, disperse the bonus
annually. Here the bonus is considered as an incentive. 1*^
In such a situation it might be considered as a deferred wage
rather than as a fringe benefit. It is interesting to note
that Owen Aldis, writing in the Harvard Business Review , states
that this once a year bonus system loses its incentive purpose
and that a company would gain more productivity if it were to
spread out the bonus payments throughout the year. In this
manner the incentive is always there before the employee. **^
The profit sharing may take the form of stock payments
in lieu of cash, but such an arrangement has tended to become
less common in recent years. 8 in such plans the employer
contributed the stock. Profit sharing was the initial step
toward employee stock ownership. Stock option plans differ
from profit sharing plans in that, in the former, the employee
purchases the stock out of his salary or wages while, in the
latter, the stock certificates are given to the employee as
his portion of the profit.
In the decade 1951 to 1961, a new form of profit
sharing has arisen. Loosely described as an Employee Savings
U6SuDra, pp. 10-11.
47
Owen Aldis, "Of Pigeons and Man,** Harvard Business
Review , XXXIX (July-August, 1961), pp. 59-63.
** 8Yoder, op. cit ., p. 498.
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Plan, it combines some aspects of profit sharing plans with
some aspects of stock ownership plans. The savings plan
includes four basic elements:
1. Voluntary employee savings, within a specified
range, are made through payroll deduction.
2. Company contributions are primarily a function
of the level of employee savings .
3. The combined funds are put into a qualified
employee trust for deferred distribution.
U • Company stock and government securities are the
predominant form of investment.
In most of these savings plans the company contribution
depends entirely on the amount of savings by participating
employees. Company profits determine the rate at which
employee savings will be matched* 4* 9 It is difficult to
predict whether or not most companies would exclude a plan such
as this from its cost analysis of fringe benefits. If it
were included, is it proper to consider such a plan as pay
for time not worked?
The third category of fringes, "payments for employee
benefits," contains federal old age benefits, unemployment
insurance, workmen's compensation, state disability insurance,
pensions, group life insurance, hospitalization, group health
and accident insurance, medical-surgical insurance, death
benefits, work shoes and clothing, separation pay allowance,
and administrative costs of the benefit program. Chapman
and Fisher include profit sharing plans and grievance payments
** 9Cf. Harland Fox, "Combining Short and Long Term




in this category, which indicates the divergent opinion on
where to categorize these fringes. 50
In this category the companies surveyed by the National
Industrial Conference Board agree that all the fringes are of
considerable monetary value to the employees. In addition,
Federal Old Age Benefits, unemployment insurance, workmen's
compensation, and state disability insurance are legally
required. There is unanimity that they should be included
as fringe benefits.
Certain of the fringes in this category are so inter-
woven with the personal lives of the employees that they
deserve separate mention in this paper. Benefits, such as
pensions and retirement, accidental injury insurance, and
disability illness compensation have become available to
employees in recent years. In certain ways the employee has
a personal interest in these benefits. Such an interest tends
to lock an employee into a certain company for his laboring
life. This lock-in creates a less flexible labor market which
may have far-reaching and long lasting effects on the country's
economy. A fluid and flexible work force has been a corner-
stone upon which the United States has rested its industrial
structure.
The fourth category of fringes as listed by the
National Industrial Conference Board survey consists of
"payments for employee services." This group includes such
50Chapman and Fisher, op. cit . t p. 38.
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diversified fringes as company sponsored social events,
dances, picnics, and outings; company furnished recreational
areas, from in-plant recreation rooms to 18-hole golf courses;
clubs and organizations revolving around drama, music, flowers,
or airplanes; and company sponsored athletic events on both
an intramural and an inter-company competition level.
Other benefits which may be found listed under this
fourth category are company cafeterias, which most companies
would include as a fringe, as well as credit unions, length
of service gifts, suggestions awards, safety clothing, and
medical services which most companies would exclude.^ Length
of service gifts may amount to appreciable sums. If large
numbers of employees become "locked-in" to a particular
employer, the day may quickly come when the costs of this
type of fringe will become significant and will have to be
included in the total "labor cost" of doing business.
In many instances the nub of the controversy over
including or excluding items as benefits revolves around the
question: Who benefits more—the employee or the employer?
Medical services is a case in point. Those companies which
would include it as a fringe benefit do so for the reason
that many of the ailments treated are non-occupationally
connected, or that the service is saving the employee outside
medical expenses. In contrast to this are those companies
51
Stieglitz, op. cit ., p. 9.
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which would exclude medical services as a fringe. In their
view the company's medical staff may in fact handle non-
occupational ailments, but the company benefits directly by
the reduction in absenteeism. Healthy workers produce better,
is their battle cry. Most companies exclude this cost as a
fringe benefit. 52
Most fringe benefits lend themselves to arguments on
both sides of the question of who benefits more. There is no
doubt in the minds of most employers why paid vacations are
an includable fringe benefit. Yet some may argue that the
worker, refreshed from his two weeks in the sun, will more than
repay the cost of his vacation in his increased productivity.
There is little doubt that what is or is not a fringe
benefit, is a question which may never be answered to the
satisfaction of all interested parties. One attempt to
classify compensation in the military resulted in a different
approach to the problem.
^
3 This project had the problem of
identifying, classifying and costing the elements of compensa-
tion for members of the uniformed services.
Compensation was classified as salary, supplemental
benefits, and "other". Included was a discussion of certain
personnel costs other than compensation. Compensation may be
52.,.,Ibid .
53
Precept to 1962 Defense Study of Military Compensa-





defined as payment for services rendered, and includes such
things as basic pay and retirement pay. This retirement pay
or pensions is considered as "deferred pay" rather than as a
fringe benefit. Military personnel receive remuneration for
things other than services rendered, *nd such remuneration
is not compensation.
Similarly, indemnities for injury and death were not
payment for services rendered but for damages incurred in
rendering the service and thus would not be considered as
compensation. '4 Unemployment compensation would not be
considered as a fringe benefit based upon this type of
reasoning. "In the same vein, certain provisions made by the
employer for the employer* s purposes may be bound to the econo-
mic advantage of the employee, but unless the provisions are
designed as economic reward for services rendered, they do not
constitute compensation."" Educational subsidies fall within
this definition. Accordingly, a civilian education is aimed
at advancement of the employer* s mission and cannot be charac-
terized as compensation. This is in conflict with the view in
some companies that an educational subsidy is a fringe benefit
and therefore compensation.
Many items heretofore regarded as benefits are resolved
otherwise in this Defense Study of Military Compensation Board
precept. Medical care for service personnel, military dis-




death gratuity, burial costs, and recreational facilities all
produce, in some degree, the effect of a benefit, but none
are designed as a reward for services rendered. Each of these
items wa6 brought into being by conditions and necessities in
the mission and operation of the employer, and was designed to
meet the employer's liability and need.^6 Some companies in
industry would not agree with the reasoning established in this
study. The study did not deny that these items cost, but did
deny they were payments for services rendered and thus were not
compensation. In fact, the survey concluded that these per-
sonnel costs other than compensation amounted to over $1 billion
in fiscal year 1959. In the same year military compensation
amounted to $13 billion.
Sometimes unusual fringes are allowed by employers or
are negotiated by the union. As an example, a brewery in
New York City, allows its workers to consume its beer during
certain hours of the day. A bakery in the same city permits
its employees to take twenty-four free bagels home every day.
New York City also has a company which bestows an extra day's
pay to each employee on the anniversary of his employment.
It might be difficult to adjudge as to which category these
fringes belong.
Computing the Cost




benefit costs can be viewed from two vantage points. One,
how does a company compute its fringe costs; and two, how
does an external agency, such as the United States Chamber of
Commerce compute fringe costs* Both views are important and
should be considered by each company when that company is about
to embark upon a round of negotiations with the representatives
of one of its unions.
From the viewpoint of the company, there is no single
cost figure which can serve the variety of purposes for which
most companies compute their fringe costs. Most commonly,
though, the cost is expressed in one or all of four ways: 5 ®
1. Annual cost of the benefit for all employees.
2. Cost per employee per year.
3. Percent of payroll.
U. Cents per hour.
Annual cost is the total sum expended by the company
over a year on a given benefit or service. It usually excludes
administrative costs. 59 Although many companies maintain
costly, elaborate accounting systems these administrative costs
have been absorbed by the company. However, with fringe costs
mounting steadily each year it would be surprising if companies
did not begin to include administrative expenses in the total
cost of the benefit package.
Some companies can easily produce figures on large
costly items such as pensions, group insurance, vacations,




holidays, and legally required payments--but few can make
available cost records on rest periods or wash-up time. To
get the costs of the smaller fringes, a company may have to
resort to the use of a computer or use some mathematical
formula.
Often many companies are hard pressed to arrive at cost
figures for some of the larger fringes, such as vacation and
holidays, because these figures are not maintained as separate
bookkeeping entries. In such instances some formula must be
devised that will produce the desired costs.
The cost per employee per year is obtained in one
of two ways: 6 ^
1. Dividing the total cost of the benefit by the
average number of employees for the year.
2. Dividing the total cost of the benefit hy the
number of employees covered by the particular
program.
If a company desires to know how much it would cost
to cover an additional participant, the second method would
be used. If the cost per employee of the over-all benefit
package is desired, then the first method is used. The
validity of either figure rests upon the unfirm foundation
of how to cost a fringe and what is a fringe. Any problem in
the area of fringe benefits continually returns to these two
basic questions. With such a shaky foundation it is little





Johnson and Johnson—-A Case Study
A case study of the Johnson and Johnson Company of
New Brunswick, New Jersey, illustrates the problems of
obtaining fringe computations.
Johnson and Johnson had long followed certain practices
designed to make it a better place in which to work. Some
practices were initiated by management, some were the result
of collective bargaining, and some were required by law. They
all had one thing in common, they all cost money.
In 19U7, Johnson and Johnson determined to compute
the cost of its entire wage package. The company anticipated
that such cost information might have an impact on the employ*
ees, would be a great help at the bargaining table, and might
provide management with a valuable control tool in departmental
cost analysis.
All of Johnson and Johnson's fringe cost analyses
were in terms of hourly-paid employees only. Based on this,
three guides were used in selecting fringe practices:
1. The cost of the practice, or a definitive
portion of that cost, must be definitely
assignable to hourly employees.
2. The cost of the practice must be clearly
measurable.
3. The cost of the practice must, in effect,
increase straight-time hourly labor costs
for production hours worked.
To Johnson and Johnson, any payment, benefit, or service that
raises the straight-time labor costs is a fringe. In 19*»7,




2. Average earnings allowance.
3. Vacations and holidays.
*+. Pensions and group insurance.
5. Separation allowance,
6. Workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation
taxes, and social security taxes.
7. Service awards.
8. Cost of uniforms.
Some items previously discussed and determined by some
companies to be fringes were excluded by Johnson and Johnson.
As an example, costs of medical services and recreational
programs, grievance pay, and "call-in 1' guarantees were exclud-
ed, primarily because it was not easy to isolate the exact
costs of these fringes.
In computing the cost of the fringes, Johnson and
Johnson thought to express its fringe expenditures in figures
that would be meaningful to employees. Therefore, to make it
meaningful to the employees, the costs were expressed in terms
of cents per hour. This cents per hour is then related to the
employees hourly rate. To simplify understanding, only one
over-all figure was published for employees, the costs were
not broken down to show how much was vacation cost, holiday
cost, or any other single benefit cost.
For management's use, Johnson and Johnson computed
the cost of each item, as well as the total cost of the
entire package. Here the cents-per-hour figure shows the
company its actual fringe costs for a productive hour of work.
Combined with base rate, it shows the cost of the wage package.
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Johnson and Johnson found it difficult to compute the
costs of fringes for salaries personnel. Hourly employees had
a convenient base, their hourly rates, from which the fringe
costs could be projected, and these projections have some
meaning. Such a comparison with hourly rates for salaried
employees becomes meaningless. The only costs figure that
might have any significance for salaried employees or management
personnel is a "cost per employee per year." 6* An interesting
problem might be posed if all of the employees became salaried.
In such a case the hourly based fringe cost would become
meaningless for all employee groups.
Comparing Costs
An internal analysis of fringe costs is often useful
to a company and is frequently its primary reason for computing
them. Ofttimes a company may be interested in comparing its
cost vis-a-vis another company in the industry. It may be
interested in how it "compares ." Such information might be
valuable to the company in preparing data for union negotia-
tions; it may find such comparison valuable when it analyzes
its own fringe benefits.
To obtain data on which to base comparisons some
companies seek cost figures from other individual companies.
Such comparisons may be pointless because of the twin questions:





minimizes the3e two difficulties is the survey. Often the
results of such surveys have only a surface similarity.
One of the most complete surveys undertaken in the
United States is one conducted by the Economic Research Depart-
ment of the Chamber of Commerce, The most recent survey
produced the summary of findings shown in figure 3. This
survey was started in 1947, when the Chamber of Commerce noted
the scarcity of statistical information regarding "the scope
and nature of fringe benefits." To insure that compatible
information would be used, the Chamber designed a questionnaire
which in 1961, was sent to a total of 277H firms. The
questionnaire was sent to a cross section of companies which
included large- and medium-sized public utilities, insurance
companies, wholesale and retail trade firms, and firms which
had reported in the Chamber's 1959 survey. The questionnaire
used, is shown in Appendix III.
The Chamber decided what it felt were properly
includable as fringe benefits and then separated them into
65four or five categories. A company, utilizing this question-
naire, can compile its own data and can determine how its






Fringe Benefits 1961 , op. cit .
64 Ibid.




CHAMBER OF COMMERCE SURVEY OF FRINGE BENEFITS, 1961
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. Fringe payments vary widely among the 1,120 reporting
companies, ranging from less than 8% to over 70% of payroll.
2. The average payment in 1961 was 24.9% of payroll, 61.64
per payroll hour, or $1,254 per year per employee.
3. Industry payments ranged from 19.3% for textile products
and apparel to 33.5% for banks, finance and trust companies.
4. Highest payments were made in the Northeast, followed by
the Western, the East North Central, and the Southeast regions.
5. Larger firms tended to pay higher fringe benefits than
smaller firms.
6. Payments for pensions were reported by 86% of the companies,
with pension payments in these companies averaging 4.9% of
payroll.
7. Ninety-eight percent of the companies reported payments
for employee insurance programs, with payments averaging
2.3% of payroll.
8. Payrolls of reporting companies included 94.7% for straight-
time, 2.5% for overtime premium pay, 0.4% for holiday premium
pay, 0.5% for shift differential, 1.7% for earned incentive
or production bonuses, and 0.2% for other payroll items.
9. Employee payroll deductions for fringe benefits included
2.7% for Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance; 0.1%
for Railroad Retirement, state sickness insurance, and similar
programs; 0.5% for pensions; and 1.2% for life, hospitalization,
surgical, and other insurance.
10. Fringe payments for 91 identical companies increased from
14.6% in 1947 to 16.8% in 1949, 18.8% in 1951, 20.2% in 1953,
21.7% in 1955, 24.1% in 1957, 24.7% in 1959, to 26.4% in 1961.
11. When a worker is hired today, or a new wage contract is
agreed upon, the wage rates established no longer measure the
cost of hiring labor, and the number of hours actually worked
no longer measure the number of hours for which the employer
must pay.
Source: Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, Fringe Benefits, 1961 » A Report Prepared by the Economic
Research Department (Washington, D. C.i Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, 1962), p. 5.
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The survey illustrated once more the major question
in the area of non-wages ; "What are fringe benefits?" Although
the Chamber of Commerce categorized fringes it went on to say,
There are wide differences of opinion regarding just
what constitutes fringe benefits, and how they should
be computed. Some do not consider workmen's compensa-
tion, suggestion awards, and other items a fringe
benefit. Others regard shift differentials, overtime
premium pay, and other payroll items as fringe benefits.
Some do not regard total payroll as the correct base
in computing fringe benefits, but would use straight-
time pay for time actually worked.
Differences of opinion regarding what constitutes
fringe benefits and how they should be computed indicate
the need for a generally accepted definition of fringe
benefits, and for a uniform method of comparing fringe
benefits with employee compensation. &6
Recent Costs of Fringes
Notwithstanding the wide disagreements on what is or
is not a fringe and the difficulties encountered in costing
fringes, two things stand out—fringes exist and they cost
the employer a lot of money. When the dollar cost is considered
in conjunction with the rate at which these costs have grown
during the last twenty years the full importance and effect of
these fringes in the labor market can be appreciated.
In 1961, as indicated in the summary of the Chamber
of Commerce findings,**' fringe payments averaged 2H.9% of
payroll for all companies. Manufacturing companies paid 23.6%,
while the non-manufacturing companied paid 27.1%. There were
extremes; four companies surveyed, paid less than 8% of payroll
56Ibid., p. 25. 67 Supra, p. «*7.
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for fringes, while at the other extreme, were two companies
with fringe payments over 70% of payroll. Translated into
dollars per year per employee, seven companies paid under
$300 while seven paid over $3000 to each employee for fringe
benefits. 68
The Chamber's survey indicated that total fringe pay-
ments as dollars per year per employee was $1254 for all
industries. The problem of excluding and including certain
items as fringes may change this amount. Figure 4, shows that
the total average payroll was $5036. However, if the computa-
tion base is changed to "straight-time pay for time worked"
or $4256, the $1254 in fringe benefits averages 29.5%.
If overtime and holiday premium pay, shift differential,
production bonus, and other miscellaneous payroll items are
considered as fringe benefits, they would total $1521, and
compared with the straight-time pay for time worked of $4256,
the fringe benefits percentage becomes 3 5.7%.
Comparisons of data collected in 1947, with that
collected in 1961, illustrates the growth of fringe benefits.
Table 1 and Figure 5 show the changes for 91 identical companies
surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce in 1947, and in the inter-
vening years up to 1961. In that period the cost of pensions
and other agreed upon payments more than doubled, while the
costs of payments for time not worked almost doubled. These
68
Ibid ., pp. 6-9.
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Legally required payments 256
Pensions, insurance, etc. 398
Miscellaneous 87
INSIDE PAYROLL $513
Rest periods, etc. 131
Paid vacations, holidays etc. 382
Overtime premium pay $126
Holiday premium pay 20
Shift differential 25
Production bonus 86
Other payroll items 10
Total $267
Source; Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Fringe
'-jnefite, 1961 , A Report Prepared by the Economic. Research Department




COMPARISON OF 19«*7, 19H9, 1951, 1953, 1955, 1957, 1959 AND
1961 FRINGE PAYMENTS FOR 91 IDENTICAL COMPANIES
Item 191*7 19<*9 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961
All industries
nn
1. As % of pay-












periods, etc. 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.5
d. Payments for
time not




etc 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9
2. As cents per





employee . . . 413 528 680 797 951 1170 1290 1428
Employer's share only
Source: Chamber of Commerce of the United States
of America. Fringe Benefits 1961 , A Report Prepared by the
Economic Research Division (Washington, D. C; Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, 1962), p. 28.

FIGURE 5 <on.,.arison of I»I7. Ifrllft. INL l»53, M>",. I»57. I».%» and IfMIl Fringe
l»aviii<'ins for !»l Identical Companies
Per cent of payroll
5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
legally Pension and . Paid rest Payments Profit-sharing
required other agreed- periods, lunch lor time payments,
payments upon payments periods, etc. not worked bonuses, etc.
Cents per payroll hour
30%






Source: Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America,
Frin ge Benefits 1961 , A Report Prepared by the Economic
Research
Department (Washington, D.0.:0hamber of Commerce, 1962). p. 29.
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two particular types of benefits are negotiable. They also
show the largest gains as far as the costs to the employers
is concerned. This is significant because here is a potential
area in whioh employers may be able to exercise some restraint
and perhaps slow down the advancing costs of doing business*
if the largest increase was in the area of legally required
payments then management would not be able to control the cost
to any great extent.
Employer fringe benefit costs are estimated at $58.5
billion for 1961 as indicated in Table 2. Total fringe benefits
in 1929 can be estimated at $1.5 billion, or 3% of that year's
$50 billion wages and salaries. There were no Old-Age and
Survivor's Insurance or Unemployment Compensation programs*
The only legally required payments were Workmen's Compensation
and Government Retirement.
Agreed upon programs in 1929* are estimated at 0.4%,
including small amounts for private pension and insurance
programs. Time paid for* but not worked* is estimated at
0.7%. In 1929* vacation and paid holidays were usually limited
to office workers, with one-week vacations common. The social
legislation of the 1930 's, and the rise in power of labor
unions, have changed all that. In 1961, "time not worked
payments," rose to 7.1% from 0.7% in 1929, a 1000% rise in
twenty-two years*
In 19S1, the average payroll of all companies surveyed




GROWTH OF FRINGE PAYMENTS, 1929 TO 1961
Type of Payment 1929 1961
(Per cent of wagesT""
1. Legally required 0*8% 5*1%
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance • • 2.1
Unemployment Compensation 1.1
Workmen* s Compensation 0.6 0*7
Government employee's retirement • • 0.2 1*0
Other. 0.2
2. Agreed-upon • • 0.*+ H.6
Pensions 0.2 2.6
Insurance •••• 0.1 1.7
Other 0.1 0.3
3. Rest Periods 1.0 3.2
k* Time not Worked 0.7 7.1
Vacations •• 0.3 3.8
Holidays 0.3 2.U
Sick Leave 0.1 0.8
Other 0.1
5. Bonuses, profit-sharing, etc. ... 0.1 1.0
Total fringe payments 3.0% 21.0%
(Billion dollars)
Wages and salaries $50.0 $278.8
Total fringe payments • l.S 58.5
Sourcet Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, Fringe Benefits 1961 » A Report Prepared by the
Economic Research Department (Washington, D. C: Chamber
of Commerce of the United States, 1962), p. 31.
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pay for overtime, 0.4% holiday premium pay, 0.5% shift
differential, 1.7% earned incentive or production bonus, and
eg
0.2% for other items, chiefly cost-of-living payments.
Not all fringe benefits are paid by the employer. In
1961, deductions from employee pay for fringe benefits totaled
4.5%, including 2.7% for Old-Age, Survivors and Disability
Insurance, 0.5% for pension plan premiums and contributions,
and 1.2% for life, sickness, accident, surgical, medical care,
and hospitalization insurance. These deductions averaged $227
per year per employee. This $227 can be compared to the $12 54
70
cost per year per employee which the employer contributes.
All components of labor costs have increased since
1948, with salaries and fringes increasing faster than wages.
Figure 6, shows that in 1948, wages constituted 72% of the
total wage cost while salaries represented 25% and fringes
3%. In 1961, wages dropped to 57% of the total cost, whereas
salaries increased to the point where it constitutes 32%, and
71fringes constitute 11% of the total. Wages constitute a
smaller percentage of the total cost of labor, not because
wages have not increased, but because there are fewer wage
earners vis-a-vis salaried employees in the labor force. In
1952, wage earners made up 75.5% of the total of all employees
whereas salaried employees made up but 24.5%. In 1961,
69Ibid., p. 25. 70Ibid .. p. 24.
71^National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., Labor
Costs and Employment in Manufacturing , Road Maps of Industry




LABOR COSTS IN MANUFACTURING
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salaried employees constituted 31.m of all employees while
72
wage earners dropped to 68.6% of the total.
By occupation, all wage earning categories showed
decreases between 1952 and 1961 t while all categories of
salaried employees showed increases* A breakdown of these
groups is 3hown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS EMPLOYED IN
MANUFACTURING BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP
Occupation Group 1952 1961
Total 100.0% 100.0%
Professional, technical and
kindred workers 5.H 8.8
Managers, officials, and
proprietors 5.2 6.5
Clerical and kindred workers 11.5 12.
H
Sales workers 2.» 3.7
Total Salaried Employees 2H.5 31.*»
Craftsmen, foremen and kindred
workers 19.8 18.8
Operatives and kindred workers »»5.5 H2.2
Laborers and service workers 10.2 7.6
Total Wage Earners ^5.5 68.6
Source: Road Maps of Industry, No. 1385, National
Industrial Conference Board, July 13, 1962.
Total labor costs rose from $»*8,60H,0Q0,000 in 19H8 to
$97,000,000,000 in 1961. A comparison of the costs of wages,




from $34,739,000,000 in 1948, to $56,500,000,000 in 1961;
salaries increased $19,480,000,000 from $11,720,000,000 in
1948 to $31,200,000,000 in 1961; and fringes increased
$7,155,000,000 from $2,145,000,000 in 1948 to $9,300,000,000
73in 1961. Thus fringe benefits have increased 43 0% since
1948 while salaries show a 260% increase versus a 160% increase
in wages. This clearly indicates that the fringe costs have
increased dramatically under the impetus of labor demands at
the bargaining table.
The Chamber of Commerce Survey emphasized the costs of
fringe benefits and the rate at which the costs have escalated
in the past fourteen years. Supposedly, these costs are
transferable into dollars in the workers hands. To the
employer they certainly represent a cost and thereby lessen
a company's net income or taxable income. This reduction
in taxable income has become appreciable and has created






NON-WAGES—THEIR EFFECT ON PUBLIC FINANCE1
Non-wage compensation has created problems for the
employer and to a lesser extent for the unions. There are
other areas in which these benefits and services have caused
an upheaval in the country's economic life—one such section
is public finance. Little is heard or read about the effect
of fringes in this area. The reasons for this dirth of infor-
mation are difficult to determine. The subject contains a
potential source of public agitation, and for this reason
perhaps, the politicians would prefer to let the subject
remain dormant.
The list of fringe benefits seems ever to grow so
that any list of "new" fringe benefits compiled at any one
time would soon be out of date. A consideration peculiar to
the tax aspect is the change in the percentage of cost of
those fringe benefits borne by the employer} generally contri-
butions by employers are not taxed while contributions from
employee wages are considered as coming from taxable income.
The future total amount of fringe benefits, changes in
the quality or form of existing fringe benefits, and changes
Thi3 chapter is based primarily on the ideas




in the number of workers and dependents covered by fringe
benefits will all increase fringe benefit expenditures.
The guaranteed annual wage has spread from a few
firms to a few industries. This will increase fringe costs
as coverage is extended to more and more employees. A shift
toward the "vesting* of pension rights, is an example of
existing fringe benefits which have increased in quality and
cost. Vesting gives the worker a stronger claim on money
contributed to the pension plan and therefore increases the
cost of the plan, Vesting is important for another reason-
it ties the worker closer to the job and to the company, making
him less mobile. For each worker who gains a vested interest
in a company there is less mobility in the country's labor
force.
Some fringe benefits have been called tax preferred,
but this implies some concept of income which would include
them as taxable income. The economic definition of income
most closely corresponding to currently accepted income tax
policy includes the general class of fringe benefits in
taxable income. However, taxation depends on legislative
enactments together with administrative regulation and court
interpretations
•
Congress makes exceptions for income which is
administratively difficult to tax, and in those cases where
it wishes to bring about social reform. The Treasury Department
has not been successful in defining taxable income in every
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case where fringe benefits were involved. The courts also
have had difficulty in arriving at a single, logical concept
of income subject to taxation.
Macaulay states the income-fringe benefit-taxation
problem this way:
The tax treatment of fringe benefits is based
fundamentally on the laws of Congress, the regulations
and rulings of the Treasury, and the decisions of
the courts. These three bodies have decided on the
taxation of individual fringe benefits as they arise,
and these decisions, collectively, form the foundation
for present day fringe benefit tax treatment.
2
The Social Security Act of 133 5, made provisions for
non-wage benefits to flow to employees, and later rulings by
the Internal Revenue Service have held that neither payment
by the employer on behalf of the employees, nor payments of
benefits from the funds to employees, would be considered
as income subject to tax.
Certain employer contributions to pension, stock-
bonus, or profit-sharing plans may be given favorable tax
treatment.
In 1950, the Treasury Department undertook to tighten
up on the taxability of certain benefits, and this shift in
policy may have been the cause of some of the increased inter-
est in fringe benefits.
In 195H, a new Internal Revenue Code was adopted which
called for a more "common sense" and less inclusive concept of
^Macaulay, op. cit .» p. 23.
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income. The philosophy which evolved from this new code was
one which resulted in a more liberal view of fringe benefits.
Much non-wage compensation has escaped federal income
taxation. The types of fringe benefits which enjoy tax favor
fall into one of three forms:
1. When tax is deferred, as in employer payments
into employee pension funds and will be taxed
at some later time.
2. When tax is not levied at all on:
a. certain payments made in kind to employees,
such as medical services, free meals,
recreational facilities, group life insurance,
or
b. certain payments into funds from which tax-
free payments will be made to the employee
upon certain contingencies, such as employer's
contributions to unemployment compensation
and workmen's compensation, and
c. certain payments to the employee when he
is ill.
3. When tax is levied at the capital gains rate,
such as in lump-sum benefits received from
qualified profit-sharing plans.
The Chamber of Commerce's 1961 survey found that
fringe benefits averaged about 61.6 cents per employee per
payroll hour. Of the benefits listed, pension plan premiums
were 10 .H cents per payroll hour. Other fringes which are
generally tax free, such as the employers share of legally
required payments, insurance premiums, discounts on goods and
services, and miscellaneous payments, averaged 20.3 cents per
payroll hour. Employer contributions to profit-sharing plans
equalled 2.0 cents per payroll hour but not all of this was
tax exempt. 3 The total cost of these tax preferred fringe
3Fringe Benefits 1961 , op. cit .. p. m.

63
benefits is 3 2.7 cents per payroll hour per employee which
leaves a balance of 28.9 cents per payroll hour to be accounted
for. About 18.8 cents of this amount was in the form of pay
for time not worked, which represents an increase in non-taxable
leisure at the same pay, and about 3.0 cents per payroll hour
was for fringes which were presumably taxed, such as Christmas
bonuses, suggestion awards, and similar payments. Also, 6.**
cents per payroll hour was paid by the employer for wash-up
time, rest periods, and similar periods of non-productive
times. 1*
The foregoing figures apply only to hourly rated
employees and salaried employees whose pay varies with time
worked. Besides these groups, executive and supervisory
personnel also receive tax-preferred benefits such as expense
accounts, use of company property, and restricted stock
options. The importance of the deferred compensation or
restricted stock option may be inferred from the fact that of
the 1,128 companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange in
1961, 63% or 711 had adopted restricted stock option plans.
In 1961, 26.*t% of payroll costs for fringe benefits
was the equivalent of 61.6 cents per hour per employee and
the total figure for wages and salaries was $278,8 billion.
U Ibid.
^George E. Lent and John A. Menge, "The Importance of
Restricted Stock Options in Executive Compensation," Management
Record , XXIV (June, 1962), p. 9.
6Fringe Benefits 1961
.
op. cit ., p. 26. 7 Ibid. , p. 30.

6*1
If about 32.7 cents per payroll hour per employee or 13.2%
of payroll costs comes as a tax-preferred fringe benefit, then
the tax base has been reduced by $36.7 billion. This figure
would not include tax-preferred fringe benefits received by
Government employees, nor prerequisites of office received by
executives. Thus there is a sizeable amount of potentially
taxable income at stake.
One of the principal reasons advanced for the exclusion
of fringe benefits from income taxation is the contention that
they are conditions of employment rather than compensation for
employment. This same reasoning can be found as the answer to
why an employee does not produce more as a result of receiving
these fringe benefits. Conditions of employment seem to
include expenditures by the employer designed primarily to
benefit himself. Compensation, on the other hand, is paid to
yield benefits to the employee. Public opinion calls for
personal income taxation to apply to compensation but not to
conditions of work. The line between the two is extremely
hazy. The question of what is a fringe benefit can be asked
once more. Every area investigated seems to unearth this
same query.
It is difficult to classify as income, outlays by
the employer in forms other than cash wages. Perhaps the
tax collector will have to be content with assessing only money
income because of the administrative costs of taxing other
forms of income. It appears that "income paid • • • not in
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cash wages, is quite difficult to tax because it silently
8
merges into conditions of employment.**
What are some of the problems arising from taxation
of fringe benefits? Initially it is the administrative diffi-
culty. Because of this problem the cost of collecting the
tax on a fringe might exceed the amount of tax collected. Such
a situation might argue for non-imposition of the tax.
A second problem concerns the uncertainty of the value
of the fringe. Such a benefit might be one which has no
market value nor cost of production. Thus, how shall a week's
vacation with pay be evaluated. Perhaps it can be assumed
that no tax problem exists because the pay received for the
vacation has already been taxed. But note it is taxed at the
same rate as the money received for a week of work which
yields no additional leisure income.
Public antipathy may constitute a hurdle to the taxa-
tion of certain benefits* Also, a social goal might call for
favorable treatment of some fringe benefits.
One or more of the above difficulties could be cited
as applying to every non-cash wage benefitting the employee.
When these difficulties are coupled to the political popularity
which springs from a failure to tax, the result is a strong
predisposition toward tax-preference for fringe benefits.
There is another side to this problem; the side which
8
Macaulay, op. cit ., p. 31.
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concerns the difficulties which might arise from excluding
these payments from taxable income.
The first problem is one of equity in taxation. For
the income tax, this would mean that simularly situated people
with equal incomes would pay the same tax. However fringe
benefits introduce a new dimension, since taxation then depends
upon the form in which income is received as well as the amount
received.
A second meaning attached to the burden of equity
calls for an equitable distribution of the burden of taxes
among different income groups. Congress in setting tax rates
determines what proportion of the tax burden should be borne
by each income group, and in this particular case had deter-
mined that the rates should be progressive. However, when
fringe benefits appear in differing amounts for different
income groups, the stated allocation of the tax burden is
distorted. Furthermore, not all individuals within any income
group receive any one fringe benefit, or even the same total
amount of fringe benefits, and so the allocation of the tax
burden is changed even more.
Taxpayers may resist taxation when they feel that they
are being taxed on fringe benefits which they strongly consider
not to be income. They may react even more strongly if they
feel that they are being treated unfairly relative to others
in respect to receiving or not receiving a tax favor which
has been given to some other group.
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A second problem arises out of the fact that fringe
benefits constitute income and yet are exempt from taxation
in many instances. Thus the tax base is reduced. If a given
amount of revenue must be raised , the elimination of some items
from the tax base results in higher rates of taxation on the
narrower tax base. Thus, fringe benefits affect revenue, the
tax base, and the tax rate.
Fringe benefits are normally given as a form of salary
increase rather than merely as a change in the form of salary
paid. Assuming revenue requirements are the same before and
after the fringes are granted, tax rates will remain the same.
If this income increase had been in the form of wages rather
than fringes, the wages would be taxable and the tax rates
could be lowered, and still produce the same amount of tax
revenue.
A perpetual motion machine can be generated through
fringe benefits. Assuming a constant revenue is required,
certain persons, in attempting to avoid taxes, seeks a tax
shelter in the form of a fringe benefit. These persons are
successful but they also produce a marginal tax rate rise.
As the tax rate rises in an attempt to maintain the revenue
constant, more persons attempt to use the tax shelter. As
they are successful in getting into the shelter the tax rate
climbs still higher forcing more people to seek shelter, and
so it goes. The absurd conclusion to this spiral is every
employee receives his entire compensation in the form of
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fringes and there is no income left to tax.
A third problem caused by fringe benefits concerns
the taxation by units of government other than the Federal
Government. The problems discussed relative to the taxation
at the federal level also exist at the state and local level.
Since these taxes are levied under different laws, and since
the role of fringe benefits as a constituent of wage income is
subject to wide variations of opinion, the amount of wages
subject to tax varies among taxing units. This leads to diffi-
culty for both the taxpayer and the tax collector.

CHAPTER IV
RETIREMENT FRINGES AND THEIR EFFECTS
Taxes have a direct impact upon the economy of the
country. The tax system which is instituted to raise revenue
should have, as one of its attributes, a lack of interference
with the normal functioning of the economic system. Economic
effects will follow not only from the imposition of the tax,
but also from any exemption from the tax. To the extent that
fringe benefits are considered as income and receive tax-
preference, they should be considered in the light of their
effect upon the economic system.
These effects can be found exerting an influence on
the allocation of resources, the mobility of labor, cyclical
stability, and other related areas of the economy.^- Fringe
benefits are often considered as though they were a homogeneous
mass, producing an effect on public finance and economic acti-
vity. However, fringes vary widely, as has been noted, and
some of them may produce widely divergent and in some instances
opposite effects. An examination of almost anyone of the
categories of non-wages illustrates this point. For example,
retirement, and other closely allied fringes illustrate the
effect they have upon the economy and in particular on the labor





By far the largest group of fringe benefits in terms
of dollars spent is the group which provides for payments at or
after retirement. The types and variety of these benefits are
infinite. Generally they can be considered to fall into one
of three categories; pension plans, profit sharing plans, or
stock option plans.
Pension Plans
In 1961, pension plan premiums and pension payments
not covered by insurance type plans represented a cost of $211
per year per employee according to a Chamber of Commerce
survey. When this cost was combined with the employer's
share of contributions to Old Age, Survivors and Disability
Insurance, $13U per year per employee, it is evident how much
retirement benefits cost the employer. In comparison military
retirement costs in fiscal year 19S9 were estimated at
$1,^97,011,755 on an accrual basis compared to the cost of
basic pay for the same year of $6, 296, 573, 0^**. In addition to
basic pay only military quarters allowances costs were larger
than retirement costs in fiscal year 195 3. The effect of
pension plans on the economy should be obvious.
2
Fringe Benefits 1961 , op. cit ., p. 15.
3 Ibid.
"Classification and Costs of Military Compensation,"




The first private pension plan in the United States
is said to have been established by the American Express
Company in 187 5. A 192 5 study of pension plans showed 2 i*5
plans in operation, with 215 of these plans reporting 2.8
million employees, 6 but the coverage offered was of uncertain
quality. Financing was largely on & hand to mouth appropria-
tion out of current capital to meet current demands. Most
benefits were parcelled out at the discretion of the employer
and could be revoked at any time. Most of the rise in the
implementation of pension plans has occurred during the past
twenty years. In 19U0, 1,965 plans covered 3.7 million
7
workers. In 1966, the number of workers covered increased
to over 1H, 000, 000 in 23,000 plus plans. 8
The increase in the number of workers covered and the
number of plans is not the only evidence of the sustained
growth in private pension plans. Private fund assets is
another signpost which indicates this growth; such assets
quadrupled between 1950 and 1960. At the end of 1960, reserves
Yoder, op. cit ., p. 681.
National Industrial Conference Board, Inc.,
Industrial Pensions in the United States
, p. 6.
7
Robert M. Ball, Pensions in the United States
(A Study Prepared for the Joint Committee on Economic Report)
,
p. 11, cited by Macaulay, op. cit ., p. 91.
8
Prentice-Hall, Pension and Profit Sharing
,
par. 1012,
cited by Macaulay, op. cit ., p. 91.
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held by private pension funds approached $50 billion; they
ghad totaled somewhat less than $12 billion ten years earlier.
During the same period, public pension funds increased from
about $26 billion to $56 billion. 10
From these funds, benefits are being paid to retired
workers, but these are not yet large, relative to payments
into the funds, because the newness of most plans has led to
a low ratio of retired workers to covered workers. Secondly,
those who are retired generally receive smaller than-norraal
pensions because of the brief period of contributions in
their names. Eventually benefit payments may equal or exceed
contributions
.
The contributions to a pension fund is not taxable
income to the employee if it is made by the employer to a
qualified plan, or if it is made to a non-qualified plan under
which the employee's interest is forfeitable. The Internal
Revenue Service has set up the general requirements under which
a pension plan is considered "qualified. "*2
The benefit paid to an employee from a pension fund
g
Miriam Kerpen and Mitchell Meyer, wThe Growth in
Corporate Pension Funds," Management Record , XXIII (July-
August, 1961), p. 18.
10TW* •Ibid .




is not considered as income to him to the extent that it has
already been taxed as income when paid in as premiums. It is
considered a capital gain if paid in a lump sum; or if paid
because of his death to his beneficiary or estate within one
taxable year, up to a $5,000 limit. If the distribution is
made in stock; the tax is levied only if and when the stock
is sold. 13
There is little doubt that a pension is a fringe
benefit which enjoys a degree of tax-preference. If an
employee received $100 in wages, the entire amount is taxable.
In contrast, if the employer pays the employee $95 in cash
and puts $5 into a pension fund, the employee pays income
taxes on the $95 at the time he receives it, but not on the
$5 put into the pension fund by the employer. This gives the
employee a tax preference. If the employee receiving the
$100 cash was tc put $5 of that amount into an annuity, he
would have been already taxed on the five dollars.
In addition to the employer contributions, the
earnings of the pension trust fund escapes personal income
taxation until distribution. The benefits, when distributed,
then become taxable income to the recipients.
Thus income paid into the fund or earned by the fund
is eventually taxed. However, the tax treatment gives a clear
advantage to the non-contributing, qualified pension plan
13
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 sec. 101(b)(2)(A),
H02(a)(2), **03(a)(2) cited by Macaulay, op. cit., p. 95.

7«*
over privately financed retirement plans. The employer may
take as a deduction the amounts paid into the plan; if these
contributions are controlled by a trust fund, the earnings are
not subject to income tax when earned; the employee pays no
tax on either the contribution of the employer or the earnings
of the pension fund until he actually receives them, usually
after retirement. It is not surprisinc that this form of
pension plan has grown rapidly.
^
There are different kinds of pension plans and they
produce different effects. The plans can be roughly divided
into three categories: (1) the vested refundable savings
pension plan, where the premium paid for the plan vests to
the worker and will be returned to him at retirement, death,
or some other stated event; (2) the vested non-refundable
pension plan, which vests premium payments in the worker's
name but which the worker receives only if he lives to
retirement; and (3) the non-vested pension plan which calls
for premium payments in the worker's name, but which the worker
receives only if he remains in the employment of the contribut-
ing employer, and if he lives to retirement. Anyone of these
can become "qualified" under the tax laws and so become eligible
for favorable tax treatment. The non-vested pension plan is
the most prominent today in terms of both workers covered and
15dollars spent.
Macaulay, op. cit ., p. 97. Ibid., p. 98.
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Use of these plans narrows the tax base in any one
year by the amount of premium paid and interest earned, less
taxable benefits paid. Obviously, a person under a pension
plan fringe benefit, can have tax-postponed money set aside
for retirement, while an employee without such a plan, or a
self-employed person, must finance his retirement out of post-
tax income. It is evident that fringe benefits give tax-
preferred treatment to those enjoying employment with a pension
plan. These plans are participated in by management personnel
and rank and file employees alike.
Pension plans give tax preference to savings and might
be expected to channel resources in this direction. An
increase in savings may cause a similar decrease in consump-
tion, which will have an effect on the economy, provided the
dollar amount involved is significant.
In addition to this shift from consumption to savings
there may also be a shift in the control over these savings.
It is possible that significant changes in investment patterns
might arise. In fact the portfolio of corporate pension funds
has undergone significant alterations between 1951 and 1960.
As has been indicated, the total assets of pension
funds has grown from $12 billion in 1950 to $50 billion in
1960. The one stable portion of the portfolio has been cor-
porate bond holdings. Increased investment in corporate bonds
kept pace with the increase in total assets, with the result
they have been the back bone of pension reserves, fluctuating
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around 50%, throughout the decade. 16
In contrast to corporate bonds, United States Govern-
ment Securities plunged from 32% to 7% of the funds assets.
Most of this decline has been offset by an increase in holdings
of common stock from 12% of assets in 1950 to 33% in 1960.
Preferred stock and mortgage bonds make up the remainder of
the portfolio. 17
One characteristic of these plans is their inflexibi-
lity. This may be an advantage to the individual who cannot
develop the saving habit, because these funds usually cannot
be touched until the employee retires. This unavailability
is a disadvantage to the individual who needs funds to meet
some emergency and finds he cannot obtain them. This forced
savings attribute is typical of these pension plans.
Macaulay states that pension or retirement plans will
have an effect on cyclical stability. First, the savings
feature of these plans is a "desirable feature if inflation
is the threat," but is "undesirable if the problem is defla-
tion." Secondly, assuming pension premium payments are fixed
amounts and do not have escalator provisions tied to wages
then the "built in stabilizing effect of the income tax is
. . . increased." Third, "outright efforts to achieve
stability through changes in tax rates would be hindered ...
18because of the smaller tax base."
17 Ibid.
, pp. 19-20. Macaulay, op. cit ., pp. 100-101.
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Perhaps pension plans have their largest impact in the
area of labor mobility. Certainly a pension plan is a fringe
benefit which fits into a welfare concept of employment vis-a-
vis the commodity concept which existed in the early part of
the 20th century.
Between a particular employer and employee,
employment builds up a strengthening network of
relationships, rights and benefits geared to length
of service; these company ties • • • restrict the
free flow of labor, causing it to congeal around
individual firms. Workers become more and more tied
to particular companies by non-priced attractions
that are non-transferable. ^
The restricting influence on the mobility of labor
stems from the non-vesting provision of the plans. If the
employee has a pension due him on retirement, but cannot expect
to receive it unless he remains with the company until he re-
tires, he will not be anxious to seek employment elsewhere. As
the fund grows larger, and the employee gets closer to the day
he will receive this money, the less willing he is to leave
his present employer.
The pension plan, together with other fringe benefits,
is "developing a single work-life attachment to a company,
which tie extends into the period of retirement of the
employee. "*0
The non-vested pension plan is the type which most
seriously hampers the mobility of labor. This limitation can
19




be minimized by allowing the employee to take his pension
rights with him when he changes employers. Less than 10% of
existing plans provide for vesting. 21 In companies where
vested plans exist, the employee usually contributes to the
plan. There are few such plans in which the employer is the
22
sole contributor.
There is a trend toward vested plans of which there
23
are two types, refundable and non-refundable. In the refund-
able type a worker receives a certain amount of funds upon
retirement, death, or some other event, such as leaving his
present employer to work elsewhere. In the non-refundable type
of plan the worker receives the benefits upon retirement but
he is not required to maintain continued employment with the
employer who grants the pension. The non-refundable vested
plan creates some administrative problems when the worker
changes employers. One system used to overcome this is to
allow the employee to take his retirement credit with him to
his new firm. Another method is to have the original employer
retain the credit as a deferred charge in the former employee's
name. The employee receives this deferred payment upon his
eventual retirement.
One method of resolving this vesting problem provides
for industry-wide or area wide plans which vest the employee's
21
Yoder, op. cit ., p. 68 9.
22 ?-\
Macaulay, op. cit ., p. 103. * J Ibid . , p. 112.
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interest in the fund even though he moves from employer to
employer. An example of this is the Toledo Area Pension Plan,
in which the United Auto Workers and some 19 employers in the
Toledo, Ohio area negotiated a joint pension fund. Employees
carry their accumulated retirement credits from one participat-
ing firm to another.* 1*
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is evident that
pensions, a fringe benefit, have a profound effect in the area
of public finance, cyclical stability, labor mobility, and
other facets of this country's economy. Before considering a
second type of benefit in this same area, profit-sharing plans,
one more point regarding pension plans should be discussed.
Pension plans may effect capital mobility in addition
to their effect on labor mobility. As an example, if workers
are covered by a non-vested pension plan and have built up a
sizeable equity in the fund, they not only cannot afford to
leave the firm, but also cannot afford for the firm to go out
of business. If this firm found itself in difficulty because
its products were being undersold by foreign competition,
managements pleas for tariff protection might be seconded by
labor. Such conditions might increase pressure for inflexi-
bility in the country's international trade policies. 2J*
In summary it can be said that pension plans are
24
Yoder, loc. cit .
25Macaulay, op. cit ., p. 101.

30
encouraged through tax preference. The advantages of more
retirement plans with higher benefits must be set off against
some of the disadvantages of such plans. The increased benefit
must be set against a smaller tax base, and a base which has
a potential for further reduction as time goes by. The inequi-
ty in treatment of workers drawing the same income but in
different capacities, and among workers drawing different
incomes must be considered. Also, a decrease in the mobility
of labor and capital is a possible consequence of increased
benefits. Lastly, from the personal viewpoint of the employee,
the savings plan with its inflexible characteristics must be
weighed.
Profit-Sharing Plans
A second form of retirement benefits is the profit
sharing plan. Such plans have been defined as any procedure
under which an employer pays employees, in addition to regular
pay, special, current or deferred sums, based on the prosperity
of the business as a whole.
Profit sharing plans are favorably regarded as methods
of compensating employees, particularly in periods of expansion
and prosperity. One of the earliest profit sharing plans was
begun in 18 91 by the South Metropolitan Gas Company, in
England. 2 ' By 1938, some H10 firms employing 26U,000 parti-
cipating workers provided these programs. Only a small
26 27Ibid., p. 117. Yoder, op. cit . a p. H98.
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percentage of American firms appear to have used these plans
prior to 19H2. 28
Since then profit sharing plans have exhibited marked
wth. Four factors have contributed to this increase;
the wage freeze during World War II, the special tax treatment
of employer contributions, employee benefits under deferred
plans, and the increasing prevalence of benefit programs in
general and of retirement programs in particular.
There is considerable similarity between pension plans
and profit-sharing plans which offer deferred payments. Both
plans call for payments to be made today into funds from which
benefits will be paid to employees at some future time. Both
may qualify for favorable tax treatment under the same sections
of the 195U Internal Revenue Code, sections H01-^0H and 501.
The principal difference between these two plans is that
pension plans generally call for management to commit a fixed
amount to the fund while profit sharing plans call for commit-
ments based on the profits of the firm. Labor has usually
expressed a preference for the assured annual contribution,
while management tends toward plans with contributions based
on earnings.
Profit sharing plans can be categorized in several




29Douglass V. Brown, "An Appraisal of Profit Sharing,"
anagernent Record , XXIV (December, 1962), p. 27.
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current payment plans versus deferred payment plans; or the
incentive designed plan versus the non-incentive type.
A "current-payment" profit-sharing plan calls for
frequent, usually annual, payments to the employees of the
profit to be shared. This type of plan does not receive tax
favor. Although the employer's payment is considered a
deductible expense, it is considered as taxable income to the
employee. The "deferred-payment" profit plan, if it meets the
requirements for qualified plans, is accorded the tax treatment
given to "qualified" pension plans. 3 ^
The history of the tax treatment of profit-sharing
plans parallels that of pension plans. The effects attributed
to pension plans, generally apply to profit sharing plans;
the major difference being one of degree.
Profit sharing plans have not yet decreased the size
of the tax base appreciably, although they may in the future.
The important effect of the tax treatment is its effect on the
taxation of other forms of income; exemption from present
taxation has led to requests for similar treatment for other
31forms of income. Those covered by profit-sharing plans are
considered to be saving rather than insuring, since the contri-
butions to profit-sharing plans is often vested in the worker's
name and refundable to him. 3 *
Profit sharing plans can be considered to have an
30Macaulay, op. cit ., pp. 117-116.
31Ibid.
,
p. 121. 32 Ibid.
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incentive effect. Such an effect may be divided into two
forms; the effect from the tax treatment, and the incentive
effect of the plan itself.
Some question the value of profit sharing as an
incentive. Profit is tied to several factors; purchasing
policies, styling, pricing policies, and plant location,
in addition to the employee's contributions. How much of the
profit increase is attributable to increased employee producti-
vity is problematical. Another reason for skepticism is that
the employee's return fluctuates. Perhaps the employee prefers
a more assured level of income and therefore the fluctuations
of profits produce an opposite effect from the one intended.
Few are willing to carry profit sharing through to its logical
conclusion--loss sharing.
Profit sharing plans effect the allocation of reserves,
mobility of labor and cyclical stability very much as pension
plans do. The lack of vesting operates as a deterrent to
labor mobility. On the other hand, since contributions to the
plan are based on profits, an element of flexibility is intro-
duced into the rewards of labor.
The results which follow from profit sharing plans
are similar to those of pension plans. The principal differ-
ence between them are that profit sharing plans involves a
smaller amount of money and are less significant than pension
plans in this respect. In 1961, pension plan premiums accounted
33Douglass, op. cit ., pp. 27-28.
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for i*. 2% of the fringe payments as a percent of payroll versus
only 0.8% for profit sharing plans. In terras of dollars per
year per employee, employer* s contributed $4 toward profit
3 5
sharing plans in contrast to $211 toward pension plans.
Also these plans appear to be more like savings than like
insurance, and that tax favor is not so often cited as a
cause for their adoption. «
Stock Option Plans
A third form of a retirement fringe benefit is the
employee stock-ownership plan or the stock-option plan. Stock-
ownership plans might be considered as another form of profit-
sharing. In England, the forerunner of the stock-option plan
was profit distribution. Originally profits were distributed
in cash; later these profits were divided among employees in
37the form of stock.
The first stock ownership plans appeared in England
3 B
as early as 1829 and in France in 1842. In the United States,
Proctor and Gamble and the Illinois Central Railway are credited
with the first such plans. Both companies started their plan
3*1
Fringe Benefits 1961 , op. cit ., p. 13.
35
Ibid
. , p. 18.
3 6
Macaulay, op. cit ., p. 124.
37






Profit-sharing plans gained in popularity and use
in the United States until the stock market crash in 1929.
For the next few years employees remained disenchanted. By
1935, many of the plans had been discontinued, and among those
still in force most were restricted to top-management group
participation . °
Since World War II interest in these plans has been
revived. These plans offer an effective means of supplementing
retirement income. This aspect is particularly appealing to
executives, and to a somewhat lessor degree to other employees.
A typical employee's stock plan is the one presently
in effect at the American Telephone and Telegraph Company.
In American Telephone and Telegraph's current plan, which began
in July, 1962, stock in the company is offered for sale to
employees of the company on an installment basis, with equal
payments being made over a twenty-four month purchase period.
The number of shares employees may purchase under the offering
is related to their pay. The purchase price of the offering
is 85% of the market price on the last business day of the
purchase period specified in the offering, but not more than
8 5% of the average market price on the day on which the offer-
ing is publicly announced. An employee is entitled to cancel
his election to purchase under any offering, as a whole or in
39
Ibid., p. 501. *°lbid.
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part, and to receive cash or purchase shares upon such
ui
cancellation.
The American Telephone and Telegraph Employee's
Stock Plan is designed for all the employees of the company
and its subsidiaries. In other companies, such plans are
restricted to management personnel exclusively. The plans
go under various titles and differ from one another in certain
respects. The "restricted" stock-option plan is a popular
type. In this plan the employee is given the right to purchase
stock in the employing company at ~ome time in the future at
a price determined today, with reference to today's market
price. If the price rises in the future and the stock is
purchased at the option price, the gain, when realized, is
42taxed at the capital gains tax rate.
A newer variation of the stock option plan is the
stock purchase plan. This plan differs from the stock option
in that the company loans the executive the money to buy the
stock, charging a nominal interest rate, and applying the
dividends to repay the loan. Any gain will be taxed at the
4,3
capital gains rate.
41American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Notice of
Annual Meeting of Stockholders, March 9, 1963, p. 7.
42Macaulay, cp. cit ., p. 144. See also Timing the
Exercise of the Employee Stock Options , 3d ed., Irving Trust
Company, 1960. See also George E. Lent and John A. Menge,
"The Importance of Restricted Stock Options in Executive
Compensation," Management Record , XXIV (June, 1962), pp. 6-13
43Macaulay, op. cit




Both stock option plans and stock purchasing plans can
be included within the meaning of the term "deferred compensa-
tion.** Deferred compensation is a fringe benefit and like
fringe benefits is difficult to define. Often authors list what
can be considered as deferred compensation rather than attempt-
ing to define it. In general, it can be said to mean, "future
benefits • . . earned through current services."*41* Pensions,
profit sharing plans, group insurance and individual employment
contracts, with provisions for future compensation, can also
be included under this broad title. 1* 5
Deferred compensation arrangements vary widely, but
they all have at least one common characteristic; they involve
extrasalary-payments by the company. In addition to those
plans already discussed there are other arrangements that call
for or provide for the deferment of a part of base salary or
a salary increase but not for the deferment of extrasalary
payments. These arrangements fall into one of two general
classes; executive bonus plans under which part or all of a
yearly bonus is deferred, or company agreements with a handful
of top executives that call for specified payments in the event
of death, retirement, or severe disability, all in addition to
T. Henry Rothschild, 2nd., "Deferred Compensation
for Executives: Recent Developments," Management Record
,





a specified minimum salary. ****
A special type of stock purchase plan known generally
as "employee savings plans** has sprouted during the past
decade. These plans have certain characteristics which
differentiates them from the various plans already discussed.
The plans are qualified under section *f01(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954. Therefore the company's contributions
to the plan can be deducted from corporate gross income for
the year in which they are made, and these contributions are
not taxable income to a participating employee until distri-
buted to him.
These fringe benefits, deferred compensation, including
stock options and stock purchase plans, are not so widely used
as pension plans, but they are becoming more popular. The
general principles discussed above in relation to other retire-
ment fringe benefits applies equally to these lesser used ones.
This discussion of this one area of fringe benefits
emphasizes the complexities involved in the field of non-wage
compensation. As fringes become more accepted as a means of
compensating employees the subject will increase in complexity.
Retirement benefits already exert a strong effect on the labor
** 6harland Fox, "A Deferred Salary Plan for Management,**
Management Record , XXIII (September, 1961), p. 8. See further
discussion of these methods of deferring compensation by John
M. Crimmins, "Phantom Stock Plans," Management Record , XXIV
(April, 1962), pp. 6-9, and Robert W. Murphy, "Executive





market, on public finance, on tax policies, and on the country's
economy. When they are combined with all the other benefits
presently enjoyed by employees, the total effect is great,
and will become ^reater in the future.

CHAPTER V
FRINGES IN THE FUTURE
A discussion of the effects produced by retirement
fringe benefits indicates how complicated and complex the
entire subject is. As each day passes fringe benefits assume
greater importance and become a larger portion of the compensa-
tion package.
A discussion of the effects produced by other fringes
such as life insurance, death benefits, unemployment and
health insurance, and many of the fringe benefits in kind,
goods and services given directly to employees, would serve
only to emphasize what has already been established.
One of the pressures which has accelerated the growth
of fringe benefits has been labor union demands at the bargain-
ing table. Such demands have produced spectacular results, at
least spectacular from the unions point of view. Or have
they?
For most of the years since World 'War II a major worry
of the unions was the instability of employment. To combat
this the unions sought and won such fringe items as supplemental
unemployment benefits and increased severance pay, all of which
made it more costly to lay anybody off. Such strategy has




that hiring as well as firing has declined.
The costs of unemployment benefits when combined with
all the costs of the other fringe benefits make companies
reluctant to hire new workers. Secretary of Labor W. Willard
Wirtz, testifying before the House Ways and Means Committee,
made the point that it becomes more economical for an employer
to pay overtime than to hire new workers. "The employer knows
that if production falls, many fringe benefits, particularly
supplementary unemployment benefits . • • will remain as a
fixed cost if added employees have to be laid off temporarily."
3Unions are aware of this situation. Still they insist
that if management did away with overtime work and hired new
employees, the country's unemployment problem would disappear.
Some unions advocate cutting the work week to 3 5 hours with
double time for overtime, contending that this will force
management to hire more people and thus reduce unemployment.
However, the fringe costs of hiring the new employees may
just eliminate the company rather than the overtime.
Unfortunately, in some industries the increase in
overtime is caused by the growing complexity of the job. 4*
The Washington Post Times Herald
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More and more of the jobs cannot be done in forty hours to say
nothing of doing them in twenty-five. An added twist of
lowering the work week comes from the number of multiple job
holders. More than three million Americans hold two or more
jobs. This number of multiple job-holders, or "moonlighters,"
equals 60% of the total of unemployed in the United States in
February 1963. If the extra fulltime jobs held by these
moonlighters were given to those who are unemployed the
country's unemployment problem would be greatly eased.
An example of this paradox is Akron, Ohio where 3 0%
to 50% of the rubber workers moonlight at either a part time
or another full time job. The short work week has not helped
the unemployment situation there.
One example in Akron points up both the moonlighting
problem as well as the fringe benefit problem. One rubber
worker worked full time for two rubber companies. He worked
for twenty-nine years at one company and for nine of those
years worked a different shift at a second company.
The company at which he worked for nine years discover-
ed what he was doing and told him to choose one job or the
other. He chose the plant in which he had twenty-nine years
of seniority, with higher pension rights and other benefits.




The Washington Post Times Herald > February 18, 1963.
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him reinstated so he could resume his moonlighting and
preserve his benefits.
Fringe benefits are contributing directly to the
present unemployment problems in the country. The solution
to the problem, if there is one, will not be simple nor will
it be determined quickly.
A further example of how compensation may become more
complicated rather than less is found in those companies which
have the Guaranteed Annual Wage as part of their compensation
package.
During World War II the United Steel Workers proposed
that certain of their members, who were permanent employees
of the companies within the steel industry, be guaranteed a
certain minimum pay per year. This guaranteed annual wage
o
proposal attracted wide attention at the time.
A special government panel, reporting to the Office
of War Mobilization and Reconversion, gave support to those
q
who favored a guaranteed annual wage. Thereafter many of the
large unions advanced specified plans for such wage provisions.




. , p. 502.
9
"Guaranteed Annual Wages: Report to the President
by the Advisory Board," Washington Government Printing




the contracts negotiated by the United Automobile Workers
with the Ford Motor Company and General Motors .^°
Guaranteed Annual Wage Plans existed before World War
II, but were not wide spread. Among the earliest and best
known were those of the George A. Hormel Company, Proctor and
Gamble, and the Nunn-Bush Shoe Company. The manner in which
these plans operate differ from company to company. For
example, the Hormel plan pays each employee his full wages for
a 36 hour week regardless of the number of hours the employee
may work. In contrast Nunn-Bush relates wages to net sales
and revises the estimate every four weeks.
Unions argue that guaranteed annual wages are socially
desirable as a means of maintaining purchasing power and
preventing recessions. On the other hand employers feel that
widespread application of guaranteed wages is impossible.
One difficulty with these plans is that no one can
accurately predict the costs of them. The costs of the plans
could easily bankrupt an employer in any prolonged depression.
The problems involved in such guarantees are complicated and
will require thoughtful solutions. Poorly selected solutions
could make idleness too attractive and thus discourage
employees from seeking work.
One solution to the Guaranteed Annual Wage fringe
would be to abolish it altogether and pay all employees a




employees on salary. Many reasons, not connected with the
Guaranteed Annual Wage fringe, have motivated this action.
Certainly the continuing rise in white-collar workers combined
with a corresponding decrease in blue-collar workers, would
be an underlying reason. Also, with the technological advances
forcing the upgrading of the industrial work force, a change
has been taking place in the socio-economic relationship
12between employers and employees.
Such revolutionary ideas were proposed by the United
Auto Workers in September, 1961 to General Motors, Ford
and Chrysler. 13 Following past union negotiation patterns,
1961' s proposal could become 1966' s demand. Management had
better prepare itself for the onslaught.
An attempt to visualize every employee receiving a
salary is difficult. The wage and non-wage compensation
structure which has slowly evolved since the beginning of
the Industrial Revolution would need a complete revision.
Fringe benefits which are tied directly to hourly rates would
have to be reevaluated. Management has had difficulty in the
past costing fringe benefits for hourly rated plans but has
thrown up its hands in despair when attempting to cost fringe
12
Paul G. Kaponya, "Salaries for All Workers,
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benefits for salaried personnel. If all employees became
salaried the non-wap,e aspect of compensations will have to
be re-structured. It would appear certain that an employee
would not give up his hard won benefits, in trade for a




As indicated in the preface, this thesis has attempted
to explain, rather than define what non-wages are; show why
they are needed; and indicate their cost to the employer.
By using retirement fringe benefits as an example, an addi-
tional effort was made to show how far-reaching an effect non-
wages have on this country's economic activities, and on
various aspects of public finance.
The use of fringe benefits has arisen for a variety
of reasons. Chief among them has been the social legislation
of the nineteen-thirties, the wage negotiations and attendant
problems which arose during the second World War, the pressure
of labor unions, and the tax status of fringe benefits. "The
tax status has been important in the growth of fringe benefits
and, reciprocally, the growth of fringe benefits has been
important in the increased interest in their tax status."
Many points which bear repetition were covered in
this presentation. Initially, there is no acceptable definition
of what are "fringe benefits," or "non-wages." This failure
to define either term adequately has led many authors and
authorities to list banefits in place of defining them; also,




this lack of definition has led to the situation where no
two employers, or for that matter, no two unions, can decide
what is properly includable and what is properly excludable
as a fringe.
Secondly, an inability to distinguish between wages
and non-wages has created a costing problem for the employers.
If management is undecided as to what it should include in its
non-wage package it certainly will find it difficult to deter-
mine how much the package will cost. To compound the costing
problem, it is sometimes difficult to assign a cost to an
identified fringe, because incomplete accounting information
is maintained.
Thirdly, the "why" of fringe benefits is not easy
to determine. In 1963, management cannot compete successfully
for the talented employee unless its "fringes" are the equal
of, or better than, its competitors. Today these non-wages
are a fact of economic life, a cost of doing business. A
"why" can be easily deduced from this. Twenty-years ago this
reasoning would not have answered the question adequately.
In 194 3, wages were frozen and non-wages were used as a loop-
hole by which strikes and other labor disturbances could be
averted. In 1933 non-wages were restricted to white collar
workers and to supervisory personnel; management had little
need to answer the question of "why?" thirty-years ago. Perhaps
the only honest answer management can give as to why it grants




A major problem in the field of compensation, a problem
not restricted to non-wages alone, but which also includes
wages, is the difficulty of separating compensation from
conditions of work. There seems to be no sharply drawn line,
but
it has been suggested that benefits accruing to
workers are more likely to be considered as conditions
of work when the benefits flow naturally from the
particular type of work, or when goods and services
purchased by the employer are consumed by all or most
employees, in about the same quantities and qualities
at the place of employment, with low marginal cost
per employee.
^
As an illustration of the effect fringe benefits
produces on the country's economy and in the field of public
finance, retirement benefits were discussed in some detail.
Pensions, profit-sharing plans, and other similar methods of
deferring compensation have grown extremely popular within the
past ten years. This popularity and growth stem largely from
the tax treatment of these particular fringes. Until, and
unless, the tax preference given to these forms of deferred
compensation is restricted, these types of non-wages will
continue to grow in use.
Deferred compensation, when combined with all other
types of non-wages, is creating a new concept within the field
of labor relations. Management must exercise extreme caution
in its hiring practices because the new employee represents an
2
Macaulay, op. cit ., p. 181.
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expensive capital investment. The hiring of an improperly
screened employee and his subsequent release may represent
a heavy expense to the company, because of fringe benefits
which accrued to the individual during his employment.
What is the solution to the many problems caused
directly or indirectly by fringe benefits? It can be con-
cluded that there is no one answer. In fact, the solution is
so interwoven with human behavior factors, about which we
know relatively little, that there may be no solution possible
until more is known about human nature.
However, there are some things which can be done now
which would hasten management , labor, and government, down the
road toward a resolution of some of the problems.
First, it is imperative that "fringe benefits" be
defined. Ground rules must be laid down upon which a base
can be built, from which future negotiations can be con-
structed. Industries must settle among themselves what they
consider can properly be called "benefits and services. n Unions
must also agree on some nasic set of rules among themselves.
Once this has been accomplished more reasonable negotiations
can then be accomplished.
Secondly, management needs to put its house in order,
or at least some companies must. Too often fringes have
grown like weeds, completely unchecked. Management must
determine how much fringe it can afford. Having done this it
can then formulate some plan which can be presented to the

101
unions at the bargaining table. Too often in the past, the
unions have been on the offense, in regards to fringe benefit
demands, and management not only has no offensive plan with
which to counteract or counterbalance these requests, but
frequently has no defensive plan available from which it can
defend itself.
It is apparent that the use of fringe benefits has
created a great number of problems in the area of public
finance. It can be concluded that attempts must be made to
improve the tax treatment for each of the benefits. The
various tax-preference aspects of many of these benefits
cannot be allowed to exist indefinitely, because the net
effect is a reduction in the tax base which places a dis-
proportionate amount of the tax burden on those who are not
in a position to receive these benefits.
The most significant conclusion which can be drawn
from this entire paper deals with the connection between
fringe benefits and the mobility of the country's labor force.
There is little doubt that fringe benefits in general, and
retirement benefits in particular, are having a profound effect
in the labor marketplace. Benefits are becoming an increasing-
ly important part of wage contracts, and, as such, an
increasingly important part of compensation for labor. There
are few, if any, signs that either their growth in dollar




It might be asked if the employee-employer relationship
is returning to a position analagous to the serf-master
relationship which existed during the "agricultural* period
of history. The answer could well be
—
yes it is. During
that era, the serf was entitled to certain well-established
rights and benefits. In return for these benefits the serf
was expected to perform certain duties and he had other
obligations. The serf found it difficult, almost impossible
to break away from what was little more than bondage. The
labor-management relationship is returning to this situation
according to some. As Richard Lester says:
No one would think of applying a labor-market
concept to the feudal economy of the mediaeval manor.
The serfs would not fit into that kind of intellectual
framework. Although employment with • • • firms is
still a far cry from feudal relationships, neverthe-
less the trend toward accumulating company obligations
and attachments is unmistakable. Consequently, it is
becoming more fanciful to visualize public employment
exchanges as potentially comprehensive labor exchanges
for the community. Less and less does labor "flow**
like commodities; more and more it is developing a
single work-life attachment to a company, which tie
extends into the period of retirement of the employee.
^





















































































































































Source: Dale Yoder, Personnel Management and Industrial





ENUMERATION OF WAGE SUPPLEMENTS










3. Lunch periods 9,
». Sick and maternity leaves




a. Death in the family
b. Shopping time
c. Medical and dental
care time (away from plant)




3. Plant neatness bonus
H. Service bonuses and awards
5. Quality bonus
6. Prize awards in employee
contests relating to
safety, waste reduction,
morale, and other sub-
jects






Bonuses, contributions, and profit sharing, for which the
employee renders no direct regular or special service
1. Current profit-sharing
payments (not related to
provisions of retirement
income)
2. Stock (thrift) plan
contributions
3. Stock purchase plan
contributions
H. Sale of company stock
at less than current
value





7. Layoff pay or allowance
8. Military induction bonus
9. Military service allow-
ance
10. Supplements to unemploy-





12. Educational subsidies or
tuition or expense pay-
ments (when not related





D. Payments to provide employee security and financial
protection against various hazards and contingencies
1. Legally required payments: a. Old-age and survivors
insurance j b. Unemployment insurance; c. Workmen's
compensation; d. State disability insurance
2. Other payments to provide protection (by insurance
or otherwise) against! a. Death; b. Nonoccupational
accident, sickness, and dismemberment; c. Hospitaliza-
tion expense; d. Medical expense; e. Surgical expense;
f. Retirement (pension and in some cases deferred
profit-sharing plans)
3 • Employee welfare fund contributions
H. Administrative costs of employee benefit programs
£• Practices and service that benefit employees primarily
1. Credit union facilities
2. Food service costs or losses
3. Employee discounts
4. Music lessons, golf
instruction, and other
services rendered at
reduced cost or at no
cost to employees and
dependents
5. Garden plots
6. Vacation, health, and
hospital facilities
provided at low cost
7. House financing
Source: C. W. Sargent, "Fringe" Benefits: Do We
Know Enough About Them? (Hanover, New Hampshire: Amos
Tuck School of Business Administration, 1953), pp. m-15,
cited by Hugh H. Macaulay, Jr., Fringe Benefits and Their





QUESTIONNAIRE USED BY THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
IN ITS SURVEY OF FRINGE BENEFITS IN 1961
Instructions
1« Coverage . If you have several divisions or plants, data
covering any typical group of employees will be satisfactory.
2. Employees covered in survey . Except for banks, financial
institutions, etc., limit data included in this report to
hourly-rated employees and to salaried employees who are paid
on a similar basis. That is, include data for salaried
employees if their pay varies depending on whether they work
overtime, or less than full time, but do not include them if
they receive their regular daily or weekly pay regardless of
hours worked. Since this definition would exclude many emp-
loyees of banks, financial institutions, etc
.
, for these firms
please include all nonsupervisory employees and all working
supervisors, regardless of their method of payment.
3. Approximate or incomplete data. If you are unable to
give exact data Tor the various items m the questionnaire,
please give estimates—we would prefer a good estimate to a
blank space. If you are unable, to break down the data on
payments exactly as we have outlined it, please give the
data that is available. Please indicate the items for which
payments were made, but for which you cannot give separate
figures.
H. Question A. Gross payroll data . For this item report
actual wages (not take-home pay after deductions have been
made). Report on line A-l the straight-time wages only, and
report premium and bonus payments on other lines. Thus, if
an employee receives $2.00 an hour for straight-time, and
$1.00 additional for overtime after 40 hours, for each hour
of overtime worked after <40 hours, $2.00 would be entered
on line A-l, and $1.00 on line A-2.
5. Items C-l, C-3, C-5 and C-7. Pension and insurance premiums ,
For pension and insurance premiums, report net payments after
deducting any dividends or credits returned to employer by
insurer. Profit-sharing payments are reported on line F-l.
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6. Question C-9. Contributions to privately financed
unemployment benefit funds . Report on this line employer
payments into unemployment benefit funds similar to those
established in the automobile, metal can and glass industries
Payments under guaranteed workweek or workyear should be
reported on line E-U.
7. Question G. Employee payroll deductions . For this
question report deductions from employee pay. Employer
contributions are reported in questions n BM and "C."
8. Question H. Payroll hours , This is the number of hours
corresponding to earnings given on line A-l. Payroll hours
for full-time employee , Enter the total number of payroll
hours for a typical full-time employee in 1961. It would be
the number of hours representing his wages shown on line A-l,
including his paid vacation period, paid holidays, paid
sick leave, etc. If hours would not be the same for all






Name of Company Official Title
Show actual data or best estimate Total amount
for employees covered in survey. for 1961
A. Gross payroll for employees in survey :
( See Instructions No . H
5
1. Straight-time pay for employees in survey $
2. Overtime premium pay Include BONUS AND $
3. Holiday premium pay PREMIUM PAY ONLY $
W. Shift differential .. on lines 2-6. $
5. Earned incentive or Report straight- $
production bonus time pay on line $
6. Other (Specify: ) "1". $
7
.
Total Gross payroll • • • . • $
B. Legally required payments (employer's share
only):
1. Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance... $
2. Unemployment Compensation (Federal and state
taxes) $





. Railroad Retirement Tax •» $
5 • Railroad Unemployment Insurance $
6. State sickness benefits insurance • $
7. Other (Specify: ) $
8. Total $
C. Voluntary or agreed-upon payments (emp-
loyer's share only ):
1. Pension plan premiums (net): (a) Past
service liability....
, $
(See Instructions No. 5) (b) Current service
premiums $
2. Pension payments not covered by insurance-
type plan • $
3. Life insurance premiums (net) $
4. Death benefits not covered by insurance • $
5. Sickness, accident, surgical or medical
care insurance premiums (net) •• $
6. Accident, surgical or medical care payments





7, Hospitalization insurance premiums
(including cooperatives such as
Blue Cross) (net) • $
a
8, Hospitalization payments not covered
by insurance-type plan • . •
9, Contributions to privately financed
unemployment benefit funds. (See
Instructions No, 6) ••••• $
a
10. Separation or termination pay allowances ... $]
11. Discounts on goods and services purchased
from company by employees •••••• $^
12. Employee meals furnished by company •• $"
13. Other (specify): ) $"
14. Total $'
D. Paid rest periods , lunch periods, wash-up
time, travel time, clothes-change time
,
get-ready time, etc ., $^
E. Payments for time not worked :
1
•
Payments for or in lieu of vacations $^
2. Payments for holidays not worked $]
3. Sick leave pay $]
4. Payments required under guaranteed
workweek or workyear $_
5. Jury, witness and voting pay allowances •••• $"
6. National Defense, State or National Guard
duty «.... • o ... . $
7. Payment for time lost due to death in
family or other personal reasons $




F. Other items :
1 Profit-sharing payments $
2. Christmas or other special bonuses,
service awards, suggestion awards, etc.
(Omit regular production bonuses) $
3. Employee education expenditures (tuition
refunds, etc.) $
4. Payments to union stewards or officials
for time spent in settling grievances or
in negotiating agreements ••••• $
S# Special wage payments ordered by courts,
wage adjustment boards, etc. $
6. Other (Specify: ) $"





6. Employee payroll deductions ;
(See Instructions No. 7)
1. Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance •• $^
2
.
Railroad Retirement Tax • • • $]
3. State sickness benefits insurance tax $]
4. Pension plan premiums or contributions ••••••• $"
5 • Life insurance premiums ...•••••••• $_
6. Sickness, accident, surgical or medical
care insurance premiums or contributions • • • • • $_
7, Hospitalization insurance premiums or
contributions (include cooperatives such
as Blue Cross) $
6. Total $[
H. Payroll hours (time actually worked,
plus holidays, vacation, sick leave and
other time paid for but not worked):
(See Instructions No. 3)
1. Total for all employees in survey hours
2. For typical full-time employee hours
!• Type of business and principal lines or
products manufactured or handled:
Source: Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, Fringe Benefits 1961 , A Report Prepared by the
Economic Research Department (Washington, D. C: Chamber




GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFICATION OF A PENSION
OR PROFIT SHARING PLAN
A. The plan is one established by the employer for the
exclusive benefit of his employee or their beneficiaries,
B. The sole purpose of the plan is to offer to the employees
(or their beneficiaries) either (a) a share of the profits
of the business or (b) an income after retirement.
C. The plan is permanent.
D. The plan is in writing.
E. The plan is communicated to the employees.
F. The plan is in effect.
If a trust is involved, the following requirements relating
to the trust must be satisfied as well:
G. It must be impossible under the trust instrument for any
of the trust corpus or income to be used at any time other
than for the exclusive benefit of the employees or their
beneficiaries.
H. The contributions to the trust must be for the purpose
of accumulating funds for distribution to employees or their
beneficiaries in accordance with a plan qualified under the
tax law, Sec. U01(a).
I. The trust is valid and existing under controlling local
law.
Source: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Prentice-Hall Pension
and Profit Sharing Service (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
loose leaf), par. 1671, cited by Hu^h H. Macaulay, Jr.,
Fringe Benefits and Their Federal Tax Treatment (New York:
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